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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH 
HALLOWAY, 
A person under eighteen 
years of age. 
Navajo Nation, Appellant. 
No. 20519 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The petitioners filed their Petition for Adoption on May 23, 
1980. (R. 2-4). Numerous hearings were held in the matter. On 
January 28, 1985, the Honorable Judge David Sam entered his 
decision in the matter granting the Petition for Adoption. (R. 
575-584). The final Decree of Adoption was signed and entered 
by Judge David Sam on February 4, 1985. (R. 585-586). It is 
from the decision and entry of the Decree of Adoption that the 
appellant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Reference is made throughout this brief to the transcript of 
the consent of the natural mother taken on May 30, 1980, (herein-
after "Tr. I"), the transcript of the hearing of April 7, 1983, 
(hereinafter "Tr. II"), and the transcript of the hearing of 
October 22 and 23, 1984, (hereinafter "Tr. III"). 
1. Michael Carter (his Indian name was Jeremiah Halloway) 
was born on May 14, 1977, to Cecelia Saunders. (Tr. II, p. 18). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The child was born out of wedlock. The natural mother testified 
that the father of Michael Carter was Ernest Yazzie, Jr. (Tr. II, 
p. 18, lines. 7-9). 
2. The natural mother testified that the initial care of 
the child was given by her mother, Bessie Begay, (Tr. II, p. 19, 
lines 4-8). The natural mother did testify that she had access 
to the child up to the time he was six months of age. (Tr. II, p. 
19, lines 11-14). Cecelia Saunders testified that during the 
initial six months, she lived with her mother, Bessie Begay and 
her step-father, Jack Begay. (Tr. II, p. 19, lines 15 to p. 20, 
line 5). After the six month period, Cecelia started seeing 
Arthur Saunders and did not live with her mother and stayed 
either at Arthur's house or at her house. (Tr. I, p. 20, lines 
2-14). 
3. Cecelia Saunders testified that she married Arthur 
Saunders in July of 1978, but could not remember the date. (Tr. 
II, p. 20, lines 18-19). Cecelia testified that the primary care 
of Michael Carter, after the initial six month period, was given 
by her mother, Bessie Begay. (Tr. II, p. 20, lines 20-23). 
Additionally, Cecelia testified that Bessie Begay and Jack Begay 
had a serious drinking problem. (Tr. II, p. 20, line 24 through 
p. 21, line 2) . 
2 
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4. Cecelia told a Navajo social worker in a home visit on 
July 23, 1982, that she gave her son, Michael Carter, to her 
mother to be cared for in order to save her marriage with Arthur 
Saunders. In that same visit, Cecelia also stated that she did 
not provide any monetary or other type of support to Jeremiah and 
that her husband, Arthur Saunders, the step-father, disliked 
Jeremiah very much. Cecelia testified at trial that Arthur did 
not like the child because he was not his son. Cecelia further 
testified that the step-father stated that he was not going to 
bother with the child and would not care for or support Michael 
Carter and would not give the child the normal love that a father 
would give a child. (Tr. II, p. 20, lines 3-20; p. 22, line 23 
through p. 23, line 9). 
Cecelia testified that there were times when the social 
workers found the child left unattended because Bessie Begay was 
drunk. (Tr. II, p. 23, lines 21-25). Cecelia testified that 
when Bessie would drink she would go on an alcoholic binge for a 
week. (Tr. II, p. 23, lines 7-9). The natural mother testified 
that Jack Begay, her step-father, had the same drinking problem 
and accordingly never assumed any care of the child. (Tr. II, 
p. 24, lines 10-15). 
5. The only contact the natural mother had with Michael 
Carter from the time Michael was six months of age is when the 
3 
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child would be brought over for approximately two to three days 
at Arthur's house every two to three weeks. (Tr. II, p. 25, 
lines 4-8; p. 26, lines 22-25). In fact, two of Cecelia's six 
sisters, Rosita and Polly complained of the care that Jeremiah 
was receiving. (Tr. II, p. 28, lines 2-6; p. 20, lines 14-19). 
6. Polly Ann Dick, the natural mother's sister, reported to 
Cecelia that she had found the child with Jack Begay who was 
drunk and that Jeremiah had not eaten. Polly was unsure of the 
number of days that Jeremiah had been without food. (Tr. II, p. 
30, lines 13-14). Polly did testify that Michael Carter had 
been passed to different people since the time he had been born. 
(Tr. II, p. 57, lines 19-20). Polly further testified that when 
she picked Michael up, the child was only wearing a T-shirt and 
underwear. (Tr. II, p. 59, lines 8-17). 
?•Cecelia, the natural mother, testified that she did not 
object to the child being taken to Utah (Tr. II, p. 31, lines 
19-20) and further that she had talked with Polly about giving 
the child up for adoption and did not object to it. (Tr. II, p. 
32, lines 13-16). 
Cecelia Saunders came to Utah on May 30, 1980, and appeared 
before the Honorable Judge David Sam. During those proceedings 
wherein her consent to adoption was taken, she was interrogated 
by Mr. Maxfield. In the course of that examination, she was 
4 
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asked whether or not it was her desire to have the child adopted 
by the petitioners, Dan and Pat Carter, and she indicated that it 
was. (Tr. I, p. 3, lines 14-16), Cecelia further testified 
that she understood that she could not change her mind and did 
not have any intention of changing her mind with regard to 
approving of the adoption. (Tr. I, p. 3, lines, 17-23). Cecelia 
indicated that she had not been paid any money except that 
necessary to travel to Utah and that she did not expect to receive 
any money after the proceeding was over. Cecelia finally testi-
fied that there had not been any other promises or inducements for 
her consent to the adoption. (Tr. I, p. 3, line 24 through p. 4, 
line 18). 
8. Cecelia Saunders testified that two years after the 
child was taken to Utah for adoption, she was contacted by 
representatives of the Tribe who indicated to her that Jeremiah 
could not be adopted out of the State. (Tr. II, p. 35, lines 3-4). 
Cecelia was asked by the Tribal members if she really wanted to 
give Jeremiah up for adoption and she answered that question by 
saying "yes." (Tr. II, p. 35, lines 6-11). In that regard, 
Cecelia Saunders was asked if there were any of her family members 
who could adopt the child and she indicated that there was only 
one sister who would take the child and that was Mini, and she had 
5 
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been determined by the Tribe, itself, not to be fit. (Tr. II, p. 
45, line 20 through p. 46, line 2). 
9. Michael Carter has been in the home of the petitioners, 
Dan and Pat Carter, since March 23, 1980. (Tr. II, p. 78). 
SUMMARY OF TRIBAL RECORDS 
After Michael Carter was born, social agencies within the 
Navajo nation became involved in monitoring the care that Michael 
Carter was receiving. Some of the Tribal records were marked as 
an Exhibit at the time of trial and the information provided 
therein is enlightening and helpful in the resolution of the legal 
issues raised by the appellants. (R. 120-191). 
1. In a home visit on January 23, 1982, Cecelia Saunders, 
the natural mother of Jeremiah, admitted that she gave her son 
away to Bessie Begay in order to save her marriage with Arthur 
Saunders. 
2. In a report of January 23, 1980, a referral was made 
to the Tribe social agencies indicating that Jeremiah was being 
neglected by his mother, Cecelia Saunders. The child was reported 
to be constantly on the go with both grandparents on their sheep 
herding job, that Bessie had a drinking problem and there were 
fifteen members living in the same household. 
3. In a home visit in March 19, 1980, Bessie Begay, the 
mother of Cecelia Saunders, indicated that Jeremiah (Michael 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Carter) had been with them since birth, contrary to the natural 
mother's testimony at trial that the care of the minor child had 
been given to the grandmother at six months. 
4. On April 30, 1980, the social worker was informed that 
Jeremiah (Michael Carter) was taken from Bessie's home by Polly 
Dick. During that visit, Cecelia, the natural mother, stated 
that she had given her consent to Polly, her sister, to go ahead 
and place Jeremiah (Michael) in a foster home in Utah. Her 
reason for making this decision was due to Bessie Begay's drinking 
problem. Another fact warranting Cecelia's decision was that 
Cecelia herself, could not keep Jeremiah (Michael) in her custody 
because the child was neglected and abused by her husband, Arthur 
Saunders. 
5* The case worker's note for May 2, 1980, indicates that 
the grandmother, Bessie Begay, continued to abuse alcohol. 
Shortly thereafter, a case worker indicated that all of the family 
relatives of Jeremiah were unstable except for the Tolths. The 
social worker's report of December 8, 1980, indicates that 
Jeremiah was residing with Dan and Pat Carter in Spanish Fork, 
Utah, and that Cecelia Saunders had put him up for adoption. In 
the assessment portion of that note, it is indicated that Cecelia 
still wanted to continue with giving up the child in order to 
save her marriage with Mr. Saunders. 
7 
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6. On December 1, 1980, a home visit was made to Cecelia's 
sister, Kathy Bilgarito. In that home visit, it was learned that 
Kathy had done the same thing Cecelia is doing. Kathy had given 
up three of her children to save her marriage with Ralph. 
In the ICWA (Indian Child Welfare Act) case update report, 
dated January 20, 1980, it was indicated that Cecelia and her 
family were residing with her mother-in-law. The note indicated 
that Arthur Saunders, the step-father, could not accept Jeremiah 
as his step-child. The report indicates that Cecelia gave 
consent to place the child in Utah for several reasons. The 
first reason was that Bessie Begay unable to take care of the 
child because of the heavy abuse of alcohol. The second reason 
was that giving up the child was necessary to maintain her 
marriage with Arthur Saunders. The note explicitly states that 
Cecelia reported that Arthur disliked the child very much, that 
he often abused and neglected the child, and that Cecelia could 
not tolerate seeing her child hurt. The report concludes that 
Cecelia Saunders was from a big family, that she had several 
sisters but all were unstable and did not have a house of their 
own. In fact, the report noted that the sisters had done the 
same thing in giving up their children to save their marriages. 
7. The ICWA narrative, March 23, 1981, indicates that 
8 
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Cecelia still had her mind set on letting the Carters adopt 
Jeremiah. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL FACTS 
1. The Petition for Adoption was filed on behalf of the 
Carters on May 29, 1980. (R. 2-4). 
2. The consent of the natural mother was signed in open 
court on May 30, 1980. (Tr. I, pp. 1-5; R. 6, 7). 
3. On May 11, 1982, the Navajo Nation filed a Motion to 
Dismiss and Transfer Jurisdiction and at the same time, filed an 
Affidavit and Revocation of Consent to Adoption signed by the 
mother, Cecelia Ann Dick. (R. 12-15). After the briefs were 
filed, the court heard oral arguments and rendered its ruling on 
July 14, 1982. The Ruling is set out in the Appendix as Exhibit 
"A." The court found the domicile of the minor child to be with 
that of the petitioners, the Carters. The court made that 
finding based upon the fact that the child's residence appeared 
to be voluntarily and purposefully removed from the natural 
mother, grandmother, and reservation to the petitioners. The 
court found that in light of the long period of time the child 
had been with the petitioners that there was "good cause" for the 
District Court to take jurisdiction to hear the matter and 
further found that the requirements of the ICWA had, to that 
stage, been satisfied. In its ruling of July 14, 1982, the 
9 
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court explicitly allowed both parties to put on evidence as it 
related to the issue of domicile which hearing would be set upon 
the application of either party. 
4. The hearing on domicile was held on April 7, 1983. At 
that time, all parties were present and presented testimony and 
introduced evidence. After the hearing, an Order was entered 
which Order was dated October 6, 1983. A copy of that Order is 
attached in the Appendix as Exhibit MB." In the Order, the court 
explicitly found that the child had been taken from the reserva-
tion by a family member with some of the family's consent and 
delivered to the petitioners for adoption. The court found that 
no one in the family protested the placement of the child with the 
petitioners. The court found that the relocation of the child 
with the petitioners was done with the intent to transfer to the 
petitioners full parental rights as it related to the child and 
with the further intent to abandon all parental rights in the 
child. (R. 182-184). 
5. After extensive discovery and pre-trial memoranda had 
been filed with the court, the court conducted a hearing on 
October 22, 1984, relative to whether or not the parental rights 
of the natural mother should be terminated in the child, Michael 
Carter. The court rendered its decision in the matter on January 
10 
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28, 1985. A copy of the decision is attached hereto as Exhibit 
HC,f in the Appendix. (R. 575-584). 
6. The Decree of Adoption was signed by Judge Sam on 
February 4, 1985. In the court's decision, it was noted that 
testimony had been received from numerous experts, including Paul 
Steven Buckingham, Dr. Robert Crist, Dr. Samuel Roll, and Dr. 
Robert J. Howell. Based upon the testimony, the court found 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the separation of the petitioners 
and the young child would result in serious emotional damage to 
the child. The court, in the same ruling, also found that there 
was serious questions as to the fitness of any of the natural 
family members to take the child. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge David Sam properly took jurisdiction of the petition 
for adoption under the U.S. Constitution and the ICWA. The lower 
court found all of the pre-requisites required by the ICWA before 
the parental rights of the natural mother were terminated. The 
lower court had no obligation to provide the Order of the Navajo 
Nation with Full Faith and Credit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO RECEIVE THE CONSENT TO ADOPTION 
EXECUTED BY THE NATURAL MOTHER. 
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The appellants contend in Point I of their brief that 
Cecelia Saunders, at the time her consent for adoption was 
executed on May 30, 1980, was not advised as to the content of 
the ICWA. That assertion is totally inaccurate. The natural 
mother, Cecelia Saunders, has misrepresented the facts to almost 
every party concerned in the case, Cecelia Saunders informed the 
Tribe for a long period of time that the child was only be to 
placed for foster care and was very disgruntled when the Tribe 
found out that she had given up the child for adoption. Testimony 
at trial was contradictory. It was Judge Sam, who after the 
hearing on April 7, 1983, explicitly found that the natural 
mother was advised at the time of her consent as to the ICWA. 
The court found that the natural mother consented to the placement 
and did abandon the child. (R. 94). 
The ICWA explicitly indicates that state courts have juris-
diction over a child custody proceeding or a case in which 
termination of parental rights is sought. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
In any state court proceeding for the foster 
care placement of, or termination of parental 
rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or 
residing within the reservation of the Indian 
child's tribe, the court, in the absence of 
good cause to the contrary, shall transfer 
such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the 
tribe, absent objection of either parent, 
upon the petition of either parent, or the 
Indian custodian, or the Indian child's 
12 
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tribe: provided, that such transfer shall be 
subject to declination by the tribal court of 
such tribe. 
In the court's ruling of July 14, 1982, the court explicitly 
found that based upon the voluntary change of residence of the 
minor child by the natural mother, grandmother, and reservation, 
the domicile of the minor child was with the petitioners. The 
court further found in view of that fact and the long period of 
time the child had been with the petitioners, that there was 
"good cause" for the court to take jurisdiction of the case. 
The argument advanced by the Navajo Tribe is deceptive and 
has been made throughout the proceedings. 25 U.S.C § 1911 is 
divided into two subparts, (a) and (b). Subsection (a) states 
that the Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction when the child 
resides or is domiciled within the reservation. However, 
subsection (b), clearly provides that when the child is not 
domiciled or residing within the reservation, that the state 
court has jurisdiction. Based upon the finding that the child 
was not domiciled or residing within the reservation, Judge 
Sam made his finding that the state court had jurisdiction to 
hear the matter. 
A review of the legislative history of the ICWA leads to the 
clear conclusion that the Act contemplates adjudication of Indian 
adoptive matters by state courts, and that such court adjudication 
13 
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comports fully with the purposes of the Act. The house report on 
H.R. 12533, which became the ICWA of 1978, stressed that the 
purpose of the bill was to provide "minimal safeguards with 
respect to state proceedings for Indian child custody," and to 
"impose certain procedural burdens upon state courts in order to 
protect the substantive rights of Indian children, Indian parents, 
and Indian tribes in state court proceedings for child custody." 
1978 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, pp. 7540-41 
(emphasis added). In response to concerns raised by the 
Department of Justice that the bill may have impermissibly 
intruded into areas of traditional state interest, the House 
reports: 
. . . the provisions of the Bill do not oust 
the state from the exercise of its legitimate 
police powers in regulating domestic 
relations. . . . 
While the committee does not feel that it 
f
 is necessary or desireable to oust the States 
of their traditional jurisdiction over 
Indian children falling within their 
geographic limits, it does feel the need to 
establish minimum federal standards and 
procedural safeguards in the State Indian 
child proceedings. . . . Id. 
The report also emphasized the "duty of state courts, 
otherwise having jurisdiction over the subject matter, to enforce 
federal substantive rights," Id., at 7541; see also, 7535. 
14 
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During House debate on the act, Representative Udall, 
who sponsored the Bill, also indicated that the Act "establishes 
minimum federal standards and procedural safeguards to protect 
Indian families when faced with child custody proceedings against 
them in state agencies or courts." Congressional Record, Vol. 
124, part 28, p. 38102. In response to concerns raised by the 
Justice Department regarding the apparent intrusion into the 
state's authority to adjudicate domestic matters, Representative 
Udall continued: 
. . . where an Indian child is residing or 
domiciled off an Indian reservation, the 
State has full jurisdiction over the child 
in a custody proceeding, including the power 
to remove the child from the parents on an 
emergency basis to protect to the child. Id., 
at 38107, (emphasis added). See also, 38107; 
Congressional Record, Vol. 123, part 29 p. 
37226 Senate Debated. 
POINT II 
THE MINOR CHILD, MICHAEL CARTER, 
WAS DOMICILED WITH THE PETITIONERS 
IN UTAH. 
There can be no question that the general rule is that a 
child born out of wedlock takes the domicile of the mother with 
whom it lives. Application of Morse, 7 Utah 2d 312, 324 P.2d 
773, 775 (1958); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 22, 
Comment C (1971). In analyzing the issue of domicile, it must be 
understood that the ICWA does not dictate the definition of 
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"domicile," but leaves that issue for the state courts to 
determine based upon the law of the jurisdiction. According to 
the guidelines published by the Department of the Interior's 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, many commentators recommend that the 
Act include a uniform definition of residence and domicile. That 
recommendation, however, was rejected. The guidelines to the 
ICWA state as follows: 
Such definitions were not included because 
these terms are well defined under existing 
state law. There is no indication that these 
state law definitions tend to undermine, in 
any way, the purposes of the Act. Recommending 
special definitions for the purposes of this 
Act alone would simply provide unnecessary 
complications in the law. 
44 Fed. Reg. 67583, 67585 (1979). 
The problem with the law cited by the appellant is that the 
trial court was not dealing with a case in which the domicile of 
an illegitimate child was to be considered. The trial court was 
dealing with a case in which the mother in March of 1980, allowed 
her child to be taken from the reservation and placed with the 
petitioners for adoption. After relinquishing physical custody 
of the child in March of 1980, with the intent to deprive herself 
permanently thereof, she traveled to Utah on May 30, 1980, and 
gave her written voluntary consent to the adoption. It was not 
until April 30, 1982, that the natural mother signed an Affidavit 
and Revocation of the Consent to Adoption. (R. 15). Thus, for a 
16 
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period exceeding two years, it was the intent of the natural 
mother to give the young child up for adoption. 
When, as in the present case, the child has been abandoned 
by both parents, the Restatement says that if "no guardian of the 
child's person is appointed, the child shall acquire the domicile 
at the home of a grandparent or other person who stands in loco 
parentis to him and with whom he lives." Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Law, § 22, Comment i (1969) (emphasis added). The 
Comment continues: "The child should therefore have a domicile 
at the home of the person who stands in loco parentis to him and 
with whom he lives even though this person is not a blood 
relative." 
The decisions of this State are in accord. In one such 
case, the Court held that the appellant, though not a blood 
relative, appeared to have assumed the status of a person in loco 
parentis. The case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing 
to determine whether the appellant was in loco parentis. Gribble 
v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). The Court stated: 
The term "in loco parentis" means in the 
place of a parent, and a "person in loco 
parentis" is one who has assumed the status 
and obligations of a parent without formal 
adoption. Whether or not one assumes this 
status depends on whether that person intends 
to assume that obligation. 
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Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66 (emphasis in the original). Although the 
Carters did not formally adopt Jeremiah from March of 1980 to the 
time the consent of the natural mother was revoked in April of 
1982, there was no question that all of the parties assumed in 
March of 1980, that the Carters would stand in the position of 
"loco parentis" to the child. It was for that purpose that the 
child was transported to Utah. It was the clear understanding of 
all parties in the case. The trial court granted the Carters 
temporary custody of the minor child on July 14, 1982. (R. 35). 
The Restatement, suggests a second way by which Jeremiah's 
domicile may have shifted off the reservation. Comment "f" 
of § 22 states that an "emancipated child may acquire a domicile 
of choice, irrespective of his parent's domicile." With regard to 
how a child who has yet to reach his majority becomes emancipated, 
the Comment states: 
[T]he majority [of states] insist upon no 
more than that the minor, having obtained 
years of discretion, maintain a separate way 
of life, either with his parent's consent or 
because they are dead or have abandoned him. 
In Hall v. Anderson, 562 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1977), the Court 
held that to find abandonment, it is not necessary to show that 
the parent has affirmatively abandoned, but rather, in most cases 
it can be better determined from the parents' actions than from 
the words. 
18 
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In Wilson v. Peirce, 14 Utah 2d 317, 383 P.2d 925 (1963), 
the Court held that where parents exhibit an intent to completely 
and permanently abandon a child, it matters not whether the 
parent has left the child with others who may be expected to care 
for the child or whether it is left to mere chance of whatever 
fate might follow it. 
Similarly, in Robertson v. Hutchinson. 560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 
1977), the Court found that the natural parent had abandoned the 
child so as to permit adoption of the child without consent of 
natural parent where it was shown upon clear and convincing 
evidence that the natural parent had either expressed an 
intention, or so conducted himself as to clearly indicate an 
intention, to relinquish parental control and reject parental 
responsibilities to the child. Completely in line with the case 
law applicable to the matter, Judge Sam in his ruling of July 14, 
1982, Exhibit "A" hereto, (R. 35), found that the domicile of the 
minor child was that of the petitioners and based that finding 
upon the fact that the child's residence was voluntarily and 
purposefully removed from the mother, grandmother and reservation 
to the petitioners. 
One of the key cases discussing the issue In the Matter of 
Dureya, 115 Arizona 86, 563 P.2d 885 (1977). In that case, 
three petitions for termination of the parent-child relationship 
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were filed and concerned three American Indian children who were 
enrolled with the White Mountain Apache Tribe. The natural 
parents of the children were White Mountain Apaches and they 
moved to dismiss the petition on the basis that the State Juvenile 
Court had no subject matter jurisdiction. The juvenile court did 
dismiss the petitions and entered an order which found that the 
Tribe had at least concurrent if not sole jurisdiction. The 
petitioners appealed. 
The Supreme Court, on appeal, found that one of the Indian 
children was placed by his unwed mother with the petitioners 
when he was six weeks old. The Court found that his mother who 
wished to return to school, brought him off the reservation to 
Lakeside, Arizona, where petitioners lived. At the time of the 
hearing the child was four and a half years old and had lived 
continuously with the petitioners since May of 1972, and had seen 
his natural mother only once during that time. 
Another one of the children was placed with the petitioners 
in September of 1969, by an elderly missionary woman. 
The third child was placed with petitioners by a worker from 
a social agency in Arizona where both of her parents were jailed 
there. A few months after the natural parents were released, 
they visited the child in Lakeside and at one time, took the 
child back with them for a short while, but returned the child to 
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petitioners in January of 1981. That child had resided with the 
petitioners for approximately six years. 
All three children had subsequently moved with the 
petitioners to Tucson, Arizona. The court on appeal stated 
explicitly that the State of Arizona had a very substantial 
interest in all of the children and found that the juvenile court 
erred in failing to take jurisdiction in the proceeding. Matter 
of Dureya, supra., at 887. 
Another important case on the issue is that of In Re 
Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d 179 (1972). In that case, the 
order of the district court in awarding the custody and care of 
a child on the basis of abandonment was affirmed by the supreme 
court. The court found that the natural father at the time the 
order was made was charged in justice court for willful neglect 
and that the child was abandoned and helpless in Valley County, 
not on the Indian reservation. The court found the father had 
been abusive, and that the mother had the child taken from 
her by order of the Tribal Court for parental neglect. The court 
concluded that the child had been abandoned. The court explicitly 
stated: 
However, the "fact11 of neglect, that of 
abandonment of a helpless infant, occurred 
off the reservation and continued for over a 
year off the reservation. The mother's only 
effort, to all practical purposes, was to 
remain in the sanctuary of the reservation 
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oblivious to the needs of her child. This 
fact alone removes the case from the hereto-
fore cited Indian jurisdiction case. 
In Re Cantrell, at 182. 
Many cases, while acknowledging a minor has the same domicile 
as the parent with whom the child lives, have stated that the 
domicile of the child who is the ward of the court is domiciled 
at the location of the court. Betts v. Betts, 3 Wash. App. 53, 
58, 473 P.2d 403 (1970). Accord, Restatement (Second) of Conflict 
of Law, § 22 (1971). 
Another similar case is In the Adoption of John Doe, 89 New 
Mexico 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976). In that case, the mother of a 
child, Navajo, placed the child voluntarily with the adoption 
agency. The petitioners were non-Indians and were challenged by 
the child's father, grandfather, and as amicus curiae, the 
association on American Indian Affairs, Inc. That Association 
challenged the jurisdiction of the New Mexico Court. The Court 
replied: 
The Association claims that the Navajo Nation 
has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
permanent custody of its minor members. 
Decisions concerning such a jurisdictional 
claim are based on cases where the child was 
a resident of or domiciled on an Indian 
reservation. Fisher v. District Court, 424 
U.S. 382, 96 Sup. Ct. 943; Wisconsin 
Potowatomies, etc. v. Houston, 393 F.Supp. 
719 (BC Mich. 1973); Wakefield v. Littlewhite, 
276 Maryland 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975). The 
record does not show that a child either 
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resided or was domiciled on the Navajo 
reservation . . . whatever concurrent juris-
diction the courts of the Navajo Nation might 
have, New Mexico has an interest in the 
welfare of a child who was in New Mexico and 
not within the boundary of the reservation, 
[citations omitted]. 
Adoption of Doe, at 916-917. See also, DeCoteau v. District 
County Court for the Tenth Judicial District, 420 U.S. 425, 95 
Sup. Ct. 1082 (1975), reh. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1975); 
Application In the Matter of Montoya, 85 N.M 356, 512 P.2d 384, 
(1973); Uppen v. Superior Court, 116 Ariz. 81 567, P.2d 12 (1977). 
Although the cases cited above were decided before the 
passage of ICWA, all that were decided on the basis of whether or 
not the Indian children were domiciled on the reservation. The 
state court's determination of domicile would be the same whether 
or not the ICWA had been enacted. 
One final matter should be noted. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-48 
(1975 as amended) states in pertinent part as follows: 
The court may decree an involuntary termin-
ation of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the Court finds either 
(a), (b), or (c) as follows . . . 
(b) that the parent or parents have 
abandoned the child. It shall be prima facia 
evidence of abandonment that the parent or 
parents, although having legal custody of the 
child, have surrendered physical custody of 
the child and for a period of six months 
following such surrender, have not manifested 
to the child or the person having the physical 
custody of the child, the firm intention to 
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resume physical custody or to make 
arrangements for the care of the child; . . . 
In this case, the court explicitly found that the natural mother 
and family had abandoned the child as stated in paragraph 4 of 
the court's ruling of October 6, 1983, as attached in the Appendix 
as Exhibit "B." Having made that determination, the sections of 
the Restatement are applicable in allowing the finding that the 
petitioners stand in loco parentis to the child which finding was 
made by the trial court in its ruling awarding temporary custody 
of the minor child with the petitioners on July 14, 1982. 
The leading definition of abandonment for purposes of 
termination of parental rights is the following from Summers 
Children v. Welffenstein, 560 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1977): 
Whether or not there has been abandonment 
within the meaning of the statute is to be 
determined objectively taken into account not 
only the verbal expressions of the natural 
parents but their conduct as parents as well 
Abandonment consists of conduct on 
the part of a parent which implies 
a conscious disregard of the 
obligations owed by a parent to the 
child leading to the destruction of 
the parent-child relationship. 
Abandonment may also be proved in a subjective 
term, as where, the "parent has either 
expressed and intentioned, or so conducted 
himself as to clearly indicate an intention 
to relinquish parental rights and reject 
parental responsibilities to his child. 
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McKinstry v, McKinstrv, 629 P.2d 1286, 1288 
(1981) (quoting Robertson v. Hutchinson, 560 
P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah 1977)). 
The law in Utah clearly gives the trial court jurisdiction 
to find the natural parent give up parental rights to the child 
in March of 1980, intending that the child was to be adopted. 
Coupled with the applicable case law in the State of Utah, 
the court found that the domicile of the minor child changed to 
that of petitioners and accordingly, found it had jurisdiction 
to decide the adoption matter. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN 
IT FOUND THAT REMEDIAL AND REHABILI-
TATIVE SERVICES HAD BEEN PROVIDED 
TO THE MOTHER AND PROVED 
UNSUCCESSFUL. 
25 U.S.C § 1912, sets out the requirements that must be 
established before a child within the jurisdiction of the ICWA 
may be placed for foster care or for adoption. Subsection (b) of 
that section provides as follows: 
Any party seeking to effect the foster care 
placement of, or termination of parental 
rights to, an Indian child under State law 
shall satisfy the court that active efforts 
have been made to provide remedial services 
and rehabilitative programs designed to 
prevent the break-up of the Indian family and 
that those efforts have proved unsuccessful. 
In the court's decision dated January 28, 1985, the court 
spelit considerable time dealing with the issue of rehabilitative 
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services. (R. 581-583, Exhibit "C" in the Appendix). In the 
court's ruling, the relevant facts are recited. The court noted 
that the natural mother had transferred the care of the child to 
the child's Indian grandmother after the initial six month 
period. The court found that the transfer was made because the 
step-father was apparently abusing Jeremiah and did not like the 
child because it was not his natural son. The court noted that 
the step-father was not going to bother with the child and would 
not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the child the 
normal love that a father would give a child. 
Of the large family that Cecelia Saunders had, the court 
noted that there was only one sister who would take the child and 
she was determined not to be fit. As noted by the court, the 
important testimony concerning the frustrated rehabilitation in 
the case came from Miss Ella Shirley, a social worker on the 
reservation. Although the extended Indian family was discussed 
the record clearly indicated the unsuitability of all the extended 
family. The social worker testified the child would simply be 
placed for adoption with another Navajo family. The social 
worker admitted, based upon those facts, that rehabilitation with 
the natural family would have been discontinued and the child 
placed with another Navajo family. The social worker agreed from 
the notes of the case worker that the natural mother had 
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vacillated continually between wanting the child back and not 
wanting the child. 
Another social worker testified that the referral to the 
social agencies was because Jeremiah was neglected. The social 
worker stated that they were interested in taking the child, but 
after doing a thorough investigation of the sisters, they decided 
that placement with those relatives would not work. (Tr. II, p. 
120, Exhibit "C" in the Appendix). 
The most important illustration of the failure of any type 
of rehabilitation of the natural mother and her family comes from 
the notes of the social agencies working with the family. 
Attached to this Brief as Exhibit "B" are two pages of a social 
worker's notes introduced as an Exhibit at trial. Particular 
attention is drawn to the note of June 7, 1983. At that time, 
both parties were looking for experts to testify in the case. 
The notes for June 7, 1983, reveals the following with regard to 
the willingness of experts retained by the Navajo Nation to 
testify as to the stability of the Saunder's home: 
Worker met with Dr. Thomas and Dr. Mellor on 
possibilities of providing evaluation of the 
family (Saunders). Both Dr's. were reluctant 
to testify in court of the stability of the 
Saunders family. They felt that it would be 
unfair on behalf of the family and not be 
able to express what may developed later, as a 
result of Cecelia's family history. Both 
Dr's. do not want to testify in court, they 
feel that this type of situation is not good 
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for their profession. I asked for names of 
other possible contacts. The worker will look 
into these contacts. (Emphasis added). 
(R. 122-123). 
Attached in the Brief as Exhibit "F" is a summary of the 
Tribal Records which were prepared from the social worker's notes 
themselves. The summary clearly indicates that Cecelia had been 
deceptive with the social agencies, that the family had a large 
amount of problems in dealing with their off-spring and certainly 
that the trial court's finding that rehabilitation efforts with 
Cecelia had been unsuccessful was justified. (R. 120-148, R. 
494-505). 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY 
DENYING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO 
THE ORDER OF THE NAVAJO TRIBAL 
COURT. 
It is important to understand the chronology of the case as 
it relates to this particular point. As indicated in the 
Statement of Facts, the Petition for Adoption was filed on May 
29, 1980. (R. 2-4). The Navajo Nation's Motion to Dismiss and 
Transfer Jurisdiction was filed on May 11, 1982. (R. 12-15). 
The trial court's first decision in the case came on July 14, 
1982, after extensive briefing and argument by counsel for the 
respective sides. (R. 35). The court took evidence on the 
domicile issue which was reserved in the court's ruling, on April 
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7, 1983, (R. 92-94), and rendered its decision and order on 
October 6, 1983. (R. 181-184). The court expressly reserved in 
the order dated October 6, 1983, the issue of whether or not 
there was sufficient basis to terminate the parental rights of 
the natural mother. After the entry of that order, both sides 
prepared for trial on the termination issue. It is at that 
juncture that the Navajo Nation apparently filed in the District 
Court of the Navajo Nation in Windowrock District, Windowrock, 
Arizona, a motion to invalidate the State action and for permanent 
custody. The motion is dated August 11, 1984, but was not filed 
with the District Court of Utah until September 7, 1985. (R. 
198-374). 
The Navajo Nation obtained an order from the District Court 
of the Navajo Nation in Windowrock, Arizona, based upon their 
motion on September 7, 1985. (R. 375-376). The return filed in 
the case indicates that the Carters were served with the order 
and motion on the 17th of August, 1984. (R. 377). The trial on 
the final elements of the case conducted on October 22 and 23, 
1984. 
The argument of the appellants that after litigating in the 
Utah Courts from 1980 to 1984, the District Court in Utah should 
simply dismiss the case and allow the Navajo Nation to go forward 
in the tribal court when the first filings made in tribal court 
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occurred over three years into the litigation conducted in the 
State of Utah. Needless to say, the contention of the Navajo 
Nation that the District Court was required by the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, Article IV, Section 1 of the United States 
Constitution of the Navajo order the full faith and credit is 
incredible. 
Article IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution 
provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state 
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every 
other state.11 In light of the fact that the issues of jurisdic-
tion and domicile were properly decided by the lower court some 
eighteen months prior to the filing of the motion with the 
Navajo court, the Utah court's ruling on the basis of untimeliness 
was wholly proper. Furthermore, regardless of the timing of the 
motion, an examination of the language and legislative history of 
the ICWA indicates that no violation of the Act occurred. 25 
U.S.C 1911 (d), of the ICWA states: 
The United States [and] every state . 
shall give full faith and credit to the 
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings 
of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child 
custody proceedings to the same extent 
that such entities give full faith and credit 
to the public acts, records, and judicial 
proceedings of any other entity. 
The clear import of this language is that states are required 
to give the same full faith and credit to Indian tribal court 
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orders and custody matters that they would to court orders of a 
sister state. This, apparently, was in response to conflicting 
state court rulings as to whether Indian laws and judicial orders 
were entitled to full faith and credit (e.g., compared Jim v. CIT 
Financial Services Corporation, 86 N.M. 784, 527 P.2d 1222 (1974) 
and In Re Adoption of Beuhl, 87 Wash. 2d 647, 555 P.2d 1334 
(1976), with Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 
P.2d 689 (Ariz. App., 1977) and Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 
222 P.2d 624 (1950), or were only entitled to the same deference 
of decisions of foreign nations, as a matter of comity. Matter of 
Marriage of Fox, 23 Ore. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975). 
The language contained in 25 U.S.C. 1911 (d) was proposed in 
H.R. 12533, the Bill which became the ICWA. H.R. 12533 was a 
rewriting of an earlier senate Bill, S.1214. 1978 U.S. Code 
Congressional Administrative News, pp. 7530, 7564. The version of 
this section contained in S.1214 (section 105), stated: 
In any child placement proceeding within the 
scope of this Act . . . every state . . 
shall give full faith and credit to the laws 
of any Indian tribe applicable to a proceeding 
under the Act and to any tribal court orders 
relating to the custody of a child who is the 
subject of such a proceeding. 
Congressional Record, Vol. 123, part 29, p. 37225. Thus, 
the earlier language which would have required each state to give 
full faith and credit, apparently across the board, to any tribal 
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court orders regarding Indian child custody, was changed to 
indicate that tribal court orders are entitled to the same full 
faith and credit as orders from other states1 courts, but not 
obtain a higher status so as to enable them to override the 
judgments and orders of state courts. See also, Note, The 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: Provisions and Policy," 25 
S.D. Law Review 98, 104, n. 49 (1980). 
The pertinent question thus becomes to what degree a state 
court before which the issue of personal jurisdiction has been 
fully litigated, and the ruling entered thereon, must then give 
full faith and credit to a long-subsequent ruling of another state 
in effect reversing the first state's ruling and denying jurisdic-
tion to that state. Clearly, the full faith and credit clause 
would not require the court of the first state to defer to a 
contrary ruling of another state's court, and such a scenario, as 
well as the Navajo Nations' reading of the ICWA in this regard, 
would violate the general rule, that where a question of 
jurisdiction has been fully litigated in the first court, the 
issue may not be relitigated by collateral attack in state or 
federal courts in another state, e.g. Fidelity Standard Life 
Insurance Co. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Yadalia, 382 
F. Supp. 956 (D.C. Georgia, 1974), aff'd., 510 F.2d 272 (5th Cir., 
1975), cert, den. 423 U.S. 864, 96 Sup. Ct. 125 (1975), Johnson v. 
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\ 
McDole, 394 F. Supp. 1197 (D.C. La. 1975), app. disitu , 526 F.2d 
710 (5th Cir. 1976). 
As to the power of a state to exercise jurisdiction to 
determine custody of a child present in the state: 
A state has power to exercise judicial 
jurisdiction to determine the custody, or to 
appoint a guardian, of a person of a child 
or adult, 
a) who is domiciled in the state, or 
b) who is present in the state or, 
c) who is neither domiciled nor 
present in the state, if the 
controversy is between two or more 
persons who are personally subject 
to the jurisdiction of the state. 
Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws, § 79. In this 
matter, the State District Court of Utah properly exercised its 
jurisdiction over a minor whom it determined to be a resident and 
domiciled within the state. It is respectfully submitted that the 
holding of the trial court was not at variance with 25 U.S.C. 1911 
(a) , which pertains to tribal court jurisdiction over Indian 
children residing or domiciled within reservations. The Utah 
court clearly would not have been required to relinquish jurisdic-
tion based upon the court order of a sister state entered after 
the jurisdictional issue had already been litigated, and under the 
terms of 25 U.S.C. 1911 (d), was not required to do so in light of 
the tribal court order. If the State court found that the tribal 
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court's jurisdiction over the matter was not exclusive, it had no 
obligation to give full faith and credit to any ruling to the 
contrary. State v. Baldwin, 305 A.2d 555 (Me. 1973). The mere 
fact that the tribal court declared itself to have exclusive 
jurisdiction (especially subsequent to the state court's ruling) 
does not require the state court to follow such a declaration. 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United 
States Constitution does not prohibit a state 
from exercising jurisdiction in a transitory 
cause of action even though a sister state 
has provided that action and the particular 
claim shall not be brought outside its 
territory. 
Cain v. Cain, 646 P.2d 505, 506 (Mont. 1982). 
POINT V 
THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF 
CECELIA SAUNDERS WAS PROPER. 
In evaluating whether or not the trial court properly 
terminated the parental rights of the natural mother, reference 
must be made to the ICWA itself. 25 U.S.C § 1912 deals with the 
burdens that must be met by petitioners in an involuntary 
proceeding before the parental rights of a natural parent may be 
terminated. Subsection (c) requires that all reports or other 
documents filed with the court are to be available to each party 
to a foster care placement or termination of parental rights 
proceeding. Section (d) of § 1912 requires a party seeking to 
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affect the termination of parental rights to satisfy the court 
that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services 
and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the break-up of 
the Indian family and further prove that those efforts have been 
unsuccessFul. That point has been addressed above. Additionally, 
Section (f) of § 1912 provides as follows: 
No termination of parental rights may be 
ordered in such proceeding in the absence of 
a determination, supported by evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt, including testimony of 
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent of Indian 
custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional of physical damage to the child. 
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f). In Point VI of the appellant's Brief, the 
argument is made that before the parental rights of Cecelia 
Saunders could be terminated, there must be a finding by the 
trial court that she was unfit. However, the ICWA in the Section 
set out above, do not require a finding of unfitness. The 
appropriate sections clearly require there be proof in the 
proceedings supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including testimony of a qualified witnesses, that the continued 
custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely 
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 
After that test has been met, it is the burden of the petitioners 
to meet the tests applicable within the State of Utah. 
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The argument of the Navajo Tribe is totally inapplicable to 
the facts of this case because parental unfitness, besides not 
being required by the ICWA, is not required in Utah before a 
court can terminate the rights of a natural parent. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-38-48 states in pertinent part as follows: 
The court may decree an involuntary termina-
tion of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the court finds either 
(a), (b), (c) or (d) as follows: . . . 
(b) that the parent or parents 
have abandoned the child. It is 
prima facie evidence of abandonment 
that the parent or parents, although 
having legal custody of the child, 
have surrendered physical custody 
of the child, and for a period of 
six months following the surrender 
have not manifested to the child or 
to the person having physical 
custody of the child a firm inten-
tion to resume physical custody or 
to make arrangements for the care 
of the child. . . . 
It is also interesting to note that the Utah Legislature has 
amended Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-48 (a). Prior to its amendment in 
1985, the Code Section listed a number of different conditions 
under which the court could consider the child's best interest. 
Subsection (a) now provides: 
That the parent or parents are unfit or 
incompetent by reason of conduct or condition 
which is seriously detrimental to the child. 
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In this particular case, the court found the requisites of 
both Subsections (a) and (b) . The trial court explicitly found 
that the natural mother, Cecelia Saunders, abandoned the child. 
Having made that determination, the court was then free to 
examine whether or not there was evidence beyond a reasonable 
doubt, including the testimony of qualified expert witnesses, 
that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian 
custodian was likely to result in serious emotional or physical 
damage to the child. 
The records of the social records of the Navajo Tribe, 
attached in the Appendix as Exhibit "E", clearly establish that 
Cecelia Saunders tried for a number of months to hide the fact 
that the child had been given for adoption by stating that the 
child was only on temporary placement. There is no question that 
the child was abandoned for a period far in excess of six months 
and further the evidence is uncontroverted that for a period of 
six months after the child was given to the Carters, there was 
not attempt or expression of intention on behalf of the natural 
mother to resume custody and control of the minor child. Thus, 
inasmuch as abandonment, on an individual basis under the 
termination statute, has been proven to the trial court, there 
was absolutely no need to establish a separate basis of 
"unfitness" of the natural mother. 
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This Court has ruled on the particular question of whether 
or not anything but abandonment must be shown in order to 
terminate parental rights. In a recent decision In Re J.P., 648 
P.2d 1364 (Utah 1982), the Court was faced with a similar 
question. In that case, the facts are as follows. On May 20, 
1980, the Division of Family Services filed a petition with the 
juvenile court asking that the parental rights of the natural 
mother of J.P. be terminated. The mother filed a motion to 
dismiss the petition stating that the statute was 
unconstitutional. The lower court granted the mother's motion to 
dismiss on the constitutional issues and the DFS appeal. 
In analyzing whether or not the statute was unconstitutional, 
the Court started with an analysis of the law prior to the 
legislative change. The Court noted that the first statutory law 
after statehood allowed a mother and father to prevent the 
adoption of their child unless the parent was adjudged guilty of 
desertion. In Re J.P. . supra., at 1366, see also, R.F. Utah, 
1898 § 4. 
The Supreme Court then noted that the current Adoption 
Statutes, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4, § 78-30-5 (1953 as amended), 
permit the adoption without a natural parent's consent if the 
parent "has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child 
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on account of cruelty, neglect, or desertion, or has abandoned 
the child." See In Re. J.P, at 1367. 
The Court then noted that the Juvenile Court Act of 1965 
empowered the juvenile court to terminate the rights of a natural 
parent who was either unfit or incompetent, or had abandoned the 
child. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-48 (1953) Chapter 40, 1980 
Utah Laws. As summarized by Justice Oaks in the decision in In 
Re J.P.: 
As in the Adoption Statute, the rights of 
parents were respected [referring to prior 
laws in Utah]: No parent could be deprived 
of his or her parental rights without a prior 
showing of unfitness, abandonment, or a 
substantial neglect. So long as a parent's 
conduct remains within those broad bounds, 
the court was not empowered to terminate 
the parent-child relationship. (Emphasis 
added.) 
In Re J.P. , at 1367. In that regard, the Court noted that it had 
always been willing to uphold the termination of parental rights 
upon a proper showing of abandonment or failure to support. See 
Adoption of McKinstry v. McKinstrv, 628 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1981); In 
Re J.P. , at supra. , at 1367; State In Re Oraill v. Thompson, 636 
P.2d 1075 (Utah 1981). In all of those cases, the Supreme Court 
upheld an adoption where the father had not provided support or 
contacted the child for a period of time and also in the case in 
which a mother who had not contacted the children was deemed to 
have abandoned them. 
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In conclusion, Justice Oaks stated in the J.P. decision as 
follows: 
We do not suggest that the Constitution 
relegates a child to the status of a mere 
chattel, to be treated or mistreated by his 
or her parents according to their pleasure. 
Consistent with all the principles discussed 
above, a parent shown by clear and convincing 
evidence to be unfit, abandoning, or substan-
tially neglectful, can be permanently 
deprived of all parental rights. [citing 
cases]. 
In Re J.P., supra, at 1377. 
So that there is no question as to what constitutes 
abandonment, reference must be made to Sommers Children v. 
Welffenstein, 560 P.2d 331, 334 (Utah 1977): 
Whether or not there has been abandonment 
within the meaning of the Statute is to be 
determined objectively, taking into account 
not only the verbal expressions of the 
natural parents, but their conduct as parents 
as well . . . abandonment consists of conduct 
on the part of the parent which implies a 
conscious disregard of the obligations owed 
by a parent to the child, leading the distruc-
tion of the parent-child relationship. 
Id. at 1159. Justice Oaks writing that decision, then stated: 
Abandonment may also be proved in subjective 
terms as where "the parent has either 
expressed an intention or so conducted 
himself as to clearly indicate an intention to 
relinquish rights and reject parental respon-
sibilities to the child. [citing cases]." 
Id., at 1159. 
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As it relates to the evidence actually introduced at trial, 
the petitioners called numerous witnesses. Linda Coray, Lynn F. 
Coray, Virginia Lewis, and Kathleen A. Orton all testified 
relative to the relationship between Michael Carter and his 
parents, Dan and Pat Carter. The evidence of the strong relation-
ship between Michael Carter and his parents was uncontroverted. 
All of the witnesses testified as to the devastating effects by 
the change of the childfs custody to some individual located on 
the Reservation would cause. Also for the petitioners was allowed 
to proffer the evidence of the petitioners Mr. Dan Carter and Mrs. 
Patricia Carter. Also, the testimony of Chad Carter and Mr. A. 
G. Hawkins was proffered to the court in the proffer, was accepted 
by court and counsel. 
As it related to the expert testimony, the petitioners 
presented almost all of the expert testimony that the Court 
heard. The first expert called was Paul Stephen Buckingham who 
received his Bachelors in Science and Psychology from Brigham 
Young University in 1972, and received a Masters of Social Work 
from the University of Utah in 1974. The Masters Degree he 
obtained was in social work. Mr. Buckingham was employed by the 
LDS Social Services in the capacity of a clinical worker. 
Mr. Buckingham's experience included employment between 1974 
and 1976 as a bilingual psychiatric social worker for the Spanish 
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speaking population in Weber County and also was the director of 
programs for Weber County Mental Health in the Spanish speaking 
unit. Mr, Buckingham related to the court how he was employed by 
the LDS Social Services as a case worker in the Indian Placement 
Program in which Navajo children were placed for the scholastics 
school year on a voluntary basis. Mr. Buckingham was directly 
involved with the placement of Navajo children for two years and 
during that time would meet on a monthly basis with children to 
assess their progress in school and their adjustments and feelings 
about the home that they were in. (Tr. Ill 59-61). 
Mr. Buckingham interviewed the petitioners and Michael 
Carter. He found no signs of depression or identity crisis. (Tr. 
Ill, p. 65) . He found the family (Dan, Pat and Michael) close 
and to be extremely bonded. (Tr. Ill, p. 68) . Mr. Buckingham 
found that to return the child to the Reservation would cause, at 
worse, "tremendous psychological damage, emotional damage, from 
the fact that he had been taken from the home that he loved and 
bonded to and put in a home where there was a very lost [sic] 
potential at the very least for neglect and at the very most a 
physical abuse" (Tr. Ill, at 77). In light of Mr. Buckingham 
experience and training, he certainly was a competent expert 
witness to testify on the issues raised by the ICWA. In the 
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Matter of K.A.B.E and K. B. E., 325 N.W. 2d 840 (S.D. 1982); In 
Re The Welfare of Fisher, 643 P.2d 887 (Wash. App. 1982). 
The next expert who testified was Dr. Robert M. Crist. Dr. 
Robert M. Crist attended the University of Utah Medical School in 
1962. He completed a rotating internship at the Holy Cross 
Hospital from July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963. Dr. Crist completed 
a psychiatric residency at the University of California at Los 
Angeles from July 1, 1963 to June 30, 1966. Dr. Crist has been 
involved in the private practice of psychiatry from July 1, 1966 
to the present. Dr. Crist testified at trial relative to his 
qualifications. (Tr. Ill, pp. 126-128). Dr. Crist talked with 
Dan and Pat Carter and also the minor child and also performed an 
evaluation that was necessary to render a psychiatric opinion in 
the case. (Tr. Ill, p. 129). For stating the opinion rendered 
by Dr. Crist, it is important to note that Dr. Crist experience 
included several post concerned with the issue of integration 
into the anglo-American culture by minority groups. (Tr. Ill, 
pp. 129-120). 
Dr. Crist testified that the Carters were a stable couple 
and that they were eager to provide a home for the child, and 
that the nurture and stimulation provided by them was more than 
most couple were capable of. (Tr. Ill, pp. 131-132). In 
addressing the question of what impact the taking of the child 
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from the Carter home back to the Reservation would cause, Dr. 
Crist stated as follows: 
I think the likelihood of that [serious 
emotional damage] is very great that you 
would be rupturing the child-parent bond 
which is one of the primary necessary develop-
ments in young people and children. He would 
be placing him in a new strange environment 
for him. . . . 
(Tr. Ill, p. 135). Dr. Crist testified that the damage would be 
irreparable. (Tr. Ill, pp. 135-136). 
Dr. Robert J. Howell then testified for the petitioners. A 
copy of Dr. Howell's report is marked as Exhibit 2 to the trial. 
Without restating all that is contained in the Exhibit, Dr. Howell 
has received his Ph.D and is a diplomat in clinical psychology, 
clinical hypnosis, and forensic psychology. His professional 
experience includes that of a Full Professor of Psychology, Senior 
Psychologist at the Utah State Hospital, Consultant Senior 
Psychologist and Supervisor of Diagnostic Training at the Utah 
State Hospital; Research Specialist, Center for Training in 
Community Psychologist, Los Angeles, and many other professional 
appointments. Additionally, Dr. Howell has published a 
extensively as is outlined in Exhibit 2 to the trial. 
Dr. Howell, after hours of work and after interviewing the 
Carters, the child, and also the natural mother rendered a 
fourteen page report to the court which is attached in the 
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Appendix as Exhibit MF." After the workup that he performed, Dr. 
Howell performed a professional opinion as the effects removing 
the child from his present circumstances: 
It is my opinion that the probability of the 
emotional damage taken place which would 
result from removing Michael from the Carter 
home, for out weighs the potential conflict 
as to Michael's not having a clear identity 
of himself as an Indian, and yet, also 
knowing he is not a Caucasian. It is my 
belief that the probability of emotional 
damage is at a very high level certainty — 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Specifically, Dr. Howell's findings were as follows: 
1. Michael is a bright youngster who has no 
memory of his life/ for two years and ten 
months on the reservation. 
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home 
that he is now in and sees Mr. and Mrs. 
Carter as his parents. In my opinion, the 
Carters are his psychological parents. 
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be 
emotionally damaged by taking him out of the 
home. The nearly five years that he has 
spent with the Carters, especially when 
considering the early age that he came with 
them, clearly speaks to be important to his 
continuing to live with them. 
4. I agree with Dr. Roll that efforts 
should be made to inculcate in Michael in 
appreciation for his heritage and I see no 
reason why contact could not be effected 
between Cecelia Saunders and Michael. 
5. I could not find any evidence that 
Michael was depressed, if he was depressed 
when Dr. Rolls saw him, it is likely that 
this is reaction to his fears that he would 
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be taken away from the Carters. He told his 
school teacher, Paula Fair, that he was going 
to see a man to determine if he could keep 
living with the Carters. 
(Exhibit 3 to trial, Exhibit "F" in the Appendix). 
In addition to the testimony of the experts regarding the 
effect of removing the child from petitioners1 home, there is 
extensive testimony relative to the fitness of the Indian 
custodian which has been set out in this Brief and is particularly 
identified in the Summary of the Tribal Records, Exhibit "E" in 
the Appendix. 
In the Matter of J.H.L & P.L.L.H., 360 N.W. 2d 350 (S.D. 
1982), the court found that evidence of conduct of not only the 
natural parents but also "other persons in and about the resi-
dence: may support a trial court's finding that severe emotional 
or physical damage would be likely if the child were returned to 
the natural parents. Id. , at 651. In the present case, the 
record indicates that the child's grandmother and other members of 
the extended family are alcoholics (Tr. II, pp. 23-25, 30) ; the 
natural mother's husband did not like the child nor did he want 
them in the marital relationship (Tr. II, pp. 21-23); the natural 
mother willing gave up the child for adoption (Tr. II, p. 31) and 
only revoked her consent to adoption after the Navajo Tribe 
indicated its disapproval of the adoption. There is also 
testimony, although not uncontroverted, that the mother revoked 
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her consent only after being subject to duress by the Navajo 
Nation. (Tr. II, pp. 60-62). 
An Arizona court has held that an Indian mother who revokes 
or relinquishes her parental rights is entitled to a return of 
the child in the absence of evidence of her fitness of a parent 
or any attempt to preserve the parent-child relationship. In the 
Matter of Appeal in Pima County, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981). 
In that case, the court almost seemed to belittle the adoptive 
parents' argument that the return of the child would be 
emotionally traumatic: 
Any potential emotional trauma to the child 
if the contemplated adoption is aborted was 
ingenered by the conduct of the adoptive 
parents not adhering to the mandates of the 
Act. 
Id., at 193. 
The relevant facts in the present case are quite different 
and distinguishable from the case cited above. In that case, the 
adoptive parents had custody of the child for only about four 
months before the natural mother revoked her relinquishment. At 
the case at bar, the petitioners had custody of the child for a 
full two years before there was indication that the natural 
mother would revoke her consent to adoption. At that time the 
child has already developed emotional and psychological bonds with 
the petitioners and it would be unfair to punish the child 
47 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
because the adoptive parents did not send him off to the 
reservation immediately upon hearing that the biological mother 
had changed her mind. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court acted 
proper in all respects in terminating the parental rights of the 
natural mother. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the litigation which has 
embroiled this young child should be brought to an end. There is 
simply no justification after hearing the testimony relative to 
the bonding of the child with his adoptive parents to continue 
this matter any further. The testimony at trial was 
uncontroverted that the child does not have any memory whatsoever 
of his life on the reservation; could not even recognize his 
Indian mother and had no desire for anything but to know that he 
was secure in his home with the Carters. The litigation relative 
to this child started in 1980, was escalated by the filing of 
motions in 1982, and finally came to some conclusion that result 
in the granting of the petition of adoption on February 4, 1985. 
The child has been sealed, ecclesiastically, to the Carters in the 
LDS Church. After that significant event occurred in their lives, 
the Navajo Nation filed suit against Judge David Sam, the Fourth 
District Court, and the Carters not only seeking to invalidate the 
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State Court proceeding, but seeking damages against the Carters. 
In essence, it was not sufficient for the Navajo Nation to 
continue to invade the child's security in addition to the 
thousands of dollars that the Carters have spent in defending 
their right to maintain a relationship with the child, the Navajo 
Nation wanted the Court to impose damages against them. A copy 
of Judge J. Thomas Greens' decision in Federal Court dismissing 
the lawsuit is attached in the Appendix as Exhibit "G." 
When all is said and done, the Court has before it the 
future of a young boy who is totally innocent to the circumstances 
around him. One would think that a child whose character and 
personality is so dear to his parents*and those persons who have 
known him should have the right to a few years of pleasant 
adolescence in which he is secure in his home and in his parents. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court acted 
properly, that the petition for adoption was properly granted, 
and that the appeal of the Navajo Nation should be dismissed and 
the trial court affirmed. 
DATED this ^ 4 day of October, 1985. 
-T^^Ly' /i\ ^/L~^ 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, ton 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ,.„ ,r »*i <\: '}' 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH U:U '""' ,..;...• 
. M i A i M - . H ^ ' - 1 - 1 1 " : : 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY "3&C D'' 
IN THE MATTER OF THE \ 
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH '] 
HALLOWAY | R U L I N G i # 19,981 
Having now considered the arguments of counsel and the mem-
oranda of law on file herein together with the applicable pro-
visions of the Indian Child Welfare Act, the court now holds, rules, 
and finds as follows: 
R U L I N G 
Under the f a c t s a n d 4 c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s c a s e as have now 
been p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t and c o n s i d e r i n g the a p p l i c a b l e law as 
i t r e l a t e s t h e r e t o , the c o u r t f i n d s t h e d o m i c i l e of t he minor c h i l d 
t o be t h a t of t h e p e t i t i o n e r s . This f i n d i n g " i s based upon t h e f a c t 
t h a t t h e c h i l d ' s r e s i d e n c e a p p e a r s t o have been v o l u n t a r i l y and 
p u r p o s e l y removed from the n a t u r a l m o t h e r , g r andmothe r , and r e s e r v a t i o n 
to the p e t i t i o n e r s . In view of t h a t f a c t and the long p e r i o d of t ime 
t h a t the c h i l d has been w i t h the p e t i t i o n e r s , t h i s c o u r t f i n d s t h a t 
a p p a r e n t "good c a u s e " e x i s t s f o r t h i s c o u r t t o t ake j u r i s d i c t i o n and 
t h a t the r e q u i r e m e n t s of t he I n d i a n Ch i ld Wel fa re Act have a t t h i s 
s t a g e of the p r o c e e d i n g s been s a t i s f i e d in o r d e r t o do s o . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h i s c o u r t w i l l p roceed t o now t ake e v i d e n c e on the 
i s s u e of d o m i c i l e i f any f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e need be p r e s e n t e d as t o 
t h a t i s s u e and a l s o on t h e i s s u e of abandonment by the n a t u r a l m o t h e r . 
E v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g on t h o s e i s s u e s w i l l be s e t upon a p p l i c a t i o n of 
e i t h e r p a r t y which a p p l i c a t i o n shou ld a l s o i n d i c a t e the l e n g t h of 
t ime e s t i m a t e d f o r s a i d h e a r i n g . Temporary c u s t o d y of t h e minor 
c h i l d t o remain w i t h the p e t i t i o n e r s u n t i l f u r t h e r o r d e r of t h e 
c o u r t . 
Dated t h i s / V * d a y of J u l y , 1982 . 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY, 
O R D E R 
A person under eighteen vears 
of age, Probate No. 19,981 
This matter came on before the Court for hearing on the 7th of 
April, 1983 and the 16th day of September, 1983. The petitioners, 
Dan Carter and Pat Carter were present at the April 7th hearing 
and represented by their attorney, Richard B. Johnson. The Navajo 
Nation was present and represented by its attorneys, Craig Jay 
Dorsay and Larry Kee Yazzie. The Court, on the basis of testi-
rnonv, evidence and the argument of counsel, now makes and enters 
the following Order: 
1. In the Court's prior ruling of July 14, 1982, the Court gav|* 
both sides the opportunitv to request an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of jurisdiction. The Court, after considering the evidence, 
finds that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter as an 
adverse proceeding for termination of parental rights and adoption 
of an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reserva-
tion of the Indian child's tribe. 
2. The Court specifically finds that the child was taken from 
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the reservation by a family member, with some of the family's con-
sent and delivered to the petitioners, for adoption. The Court 
finds that the transfer of the child to the petitioners by the 
biological family of the child was done in what some members of the 
family felt was the child's best interests. The Court finds that 
no one in the family of the child protested placement of the child 
with the petitioners. 
3. The Court finds that the relocation of the. child with the 
petititoners was done with the intent to transfer to the Carters 
full parental rights as it relates to the child and with the further 
intent to abandon all parental rights in the child. 
4. The Court finds further that the natural mother and the 
family have abandoned the child and that prior to the Court's 
awarding of temporary custody of the minor child to the petitioners 
on July 14, 1982, the petitioners stood in the position of loco 
jparentls to Jeremiah Halloway. 
5. The Court finds further that on the basis of the Court's 
determination of domicile and the Court's finding that the child 
had a residence with the petitioners in Utah Countv, State of Utah, 
the Court finds further that there is good cause pursuant to 
25 U.S.C.S. §1911(b) for this Court to retain jurisdiction based 
upon the findings of the Court that there has been a long period of 
time that the child has been with the petitioners; the fact that no 
Indian custodian has been appointed and that the custody and 
-2-
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parental rights to the child had been voluntarily relinquished by 
the parents and family; that the child has had little contact with 
the tribe for a significant period of time; that the child has not 
resided on the reservation for a significant period of time and 
that the child has significant contact with this district; and, that 
the convenience and assessibility of witnesses best able to deter-
mine the status, condition and health of the child are located in 
this district. 
6. The Court makes no ruling with respect to termination of 
parental rights as it relates to Jeremiah Halloway, the Court 
determining that the petitioners must meet the burden of 25 U.S.C.S 
51912(f) by proving beyond a resonable doubt from the evidence, 
including testimonv of qualified expert witnesses, that the 
continued custody of the child bv the parent or Indian custody is 
likelv to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the 
child. The Court will be guided by the Indian Child Welfare Act 
25 U.S.C.S. §1901 et seq. and those matters contemplated by said 
Act. 
7. The Court finds that the natural mother has withdrawn her i 
consent prior to the entry of a Decree of Adoption. 
8. Accordinglv, the Court orders that the matter be set for 
hearing at a time convenient for counsel to determine whether or 
not parental rights should be terminated. 
9. The Court notes the stipulation of the parties recognizing 
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the rights of the Court to enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree in this matter after a hearing of all of the evidence 
10. The Court orders that the records previously ordered to 
become part of the record on April 7, 1983 hearing be made part of 
this record. 
11. All motions for sanctions are, as of the present time, 
denied. 
DATED this C * day of er, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: JUDGE DAVID SAM 
LARRY KEQ^TAZZIE *^ 
Attorneys for Navajo Nation 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH'-XMNTrfp ?»hr>, 
i ' '' c. i 
STATE OF UTAH TH''•"•-"-r-..::; ;* 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ] 
ADOPTION OF JEREMIAH 
HALLOWAY, A PERSON ; 
UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF 
AGE 
(
 D E C I S I O N 
# 19,981 
FEDERAL LAW 
This case is before the Court on petitioner's Motion to Terminate 
the Parental Rights of the Natural Mother of Jeremiah Halloway, a 
Navajo Indian Child. The controlling law in this case is the Indian 
Child Welfare Act. The portions of that act we are specifically con-
cerned with are the following: 
25 U.S.C. Sec 1912(d) 
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement 
of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child 
under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts 
have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative 
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family 
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. 
25 U.S.C. Sec. 1912(f) 
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such 
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of 
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the 
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result 
in serious emotional or physicial damage to the child. 
The child was placed with the petitioners on March 23, 1980; the 
biological mother consented to the adoption of the child on May 30, 1980. 
The petitioners notified the Navajo Nation of their intent to adopt the 
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child and on April 30, 1982 the mother revoked her consent to the 
adoption. Testimony was taken on these matters on April 7, 1983 and 
trial was held on October 22, 1984. 
Testimony of experts concerning the effect of taking the child 
from the petitioner's home and replacing him in the reservation is 
summarized here. 
Damage to the Child 
Paul Steven Buckingham 
Mr. Buckingham interviewed the petitioners and Jeremiah. He found 
no signs of depression or identity crisis. (October transcript page 
6 5 ) . He found them to be extremely bonded (October transcript page 
6 8 ) . He found that to return the child to the reservation would cause 
at worst "tremendous physhological damage, emotional damage, from the 
fact that he has been taken from the home that he felt loved and bonded 
to and put in a home where there was a wery lost [sic] potential at 
the yery least for neglect and at the very most of physical abuse." 
(October transcript page 77) 
The Navajo Nation has challenged the testimony of Mr. Buckingham 
on the grounds that he did not have sufficient qualifications to testify 
as an expert under the ICWA Mr. Buckingham's qualifications were set 
out as follows: Bachelors Degree in Science and Psychology from BYU in 
1972; Masters of Social Work from the University of Utah in 1974; 
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Clinical Worker for L.D.S. Social Services for last eight years; 
case worker in the Indian Placement Program for Navajo children. He 
has also worked with Navajo children on the reservation. He has had 
a Navajo youth in his home for the last five years. These are ample 
qualifications in light of In the Matter of K.A.B.E. and K.B.E, 325 
NW2d 840 (S.D. 1982). In that case, the South Dakota Supreme Court 
found that a person who had worked as a social worker for over four 
years, had a bachelor of arts degree in social work and had contact 
with Indians on a regular basis was a qualified expert under the ICWA. 
See also, In re the Welfare of Fisher, 643 P.2d 887 (Wash. App. 1982). 
Dr. Robert M. Crist 
Dr. Robert M. Crist also testified regarding the effect of return-
ing the child to the reservation. He stated that "the likelihood of 
that is very great that you would be rupturing the child-parent bond 
which is one of those primary necessary developments in young people 
and children. You would be placing him in a new strange environment 
for him. There would be a questions as to who would be the parent 
figures in the future." Again, the Navajo Nation challenged Dr. 
Crist's qualifications to testify as an expert. While the witness's 
experience had not been with Navajo people per se, his work in psy-
chiatry and minority integration are sufficient to qualify him to 
testify. 
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Dr. Samuel Roll 
Dr. Samuel Roll, called on behalf of the Navajo Nation, submitted 
a report (Exhibit 4) based upon his evaluation of the child and back-
ground information supplied by counsel for the tribe. Dr. Roll found 
that the child is mildly depressed and that he has a negative image of 
Indians. With regard to the child's attachment to the petitioners, 
Dr. Roll found that 
Jeremiah is yery closely and warmly bonded and attached 
to the Carters. It is clear that he sees them as faithful 
and powerful sources of stimulation, confidence and security. 
He also looks to them for positive productive discipline. His 
love and bonding to them \/ery strongly speaks to the value that 
the relationship with the Carters has for him. It will be ex-
tremely difficult for Jeremiah to make a break with the Carters 
and will cause considerable pain and a period of painful mourn-
ing. It is clear that Jeremiah will not be able to go through 
this period successfully without close supervision and pro-
fessional help. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Roll's opinion was that the child should be taken 
from the petitioner's home and replaced with the tribe so that he would 
not suffer an identify crisis in his adolescent years. 
Dr. Robert J. Howell 
Testimony and a report (Exhibit 3) prepared by Dr. Robert J. 
Howell reveal that after his examination of the child, and conversa-
tions with the child's teachers and the petitioners, he formed a pro-
fessional opinion as to the effect of removing the child from his 
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present circumstances: 
It is my opinion that the probability of emotional 
damage taking place which would result from removing Michael 
from the Carter home, far outweighs the potential conflict 
QS to MichaelC's] not having a clear identity of himself as 
an Indian, and yet, also knowing that he is not Caucasion. 
It is my belief that the probability of emotional damage is 
at a \/ery high level of certainty--beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Specifically, Dr. Howell's findings were as follows: 
1. Michael is a bright youngster who has no memory of 
his life for, two years and ten months on the reservation. 
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home that he is now 
in and sees Mr. and Mrs. Carter as his parents. In my opinion, 
the Carters are his psychological parents. 
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be emotionally 
damaged by taking him out of the home. The nearly five years 
that he has spent with the Carters, especially, when consider-
ing the early age that he came with them, clearly speaks to 
the importance of his continuing to live with them. 
4. I agree with Dr. Roll that effort should be made to 
inculcate in Michael an appreciation for his heritage, and I 
see no reason why contact could not be effected between Cecelia 
Sanders and Michael. 
5. I could not find any evidence that Michael was de-
pressed, if he was depressed when Dr. Roll saw him, it is likely 
that this was a reaction to his fears that he would be taken 
away from the Carters. He told his school teacher Paula Farrer 
that he was going to see a man to determine if he could keep 
living with the carters. 
In addition to the testimony of experts regarding the effect of 
removing the child from the petitioner's home, there was (in the April 
hearing) some testimony regarding the fitness of his Indian custodians. 
In In the Matter of J.H.L. and P.L.L.H., 316 NW2d 650 (S.D. 1982), 
the court found that evidence of conduct of not only the natural parents 
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but also "other persons in and about the residence'1 may support a 
trial court's finding that seyere emotional or physical damage would 
be likely if the child were returned to the natural parents. _I_d.at 651. 
In the present case, the record indicates that the child's grandmother 
and other members of the extended family are alcoholic (April transcript 
pages 23-25,30); the natural mother's husband did not like the child 
nor did he want him in the marital relationship (April transcript pages 
2 1 - 2 3 ) ; the natural mother willingly gave the child up for adoption 
(April transcript page 31) and only revoked her consent to the adoption 
after the Navajo Nation indicated its disapproval of the adoption. 
There is also testimony, although not uncontroverted, that the mother 
revoked her consent only after being subject to duress by the Navajo 
Nation. (April transcript pages 6 0 - 6 2 ) . 
An Arizona court has held that an Indian mother who revokes her 
relinquishment of parental rights is entitled to the return of the 
child in the absence of evidence of her fitness as a parent or any 
attempt to preserve the parent-child relationship. Matter of Appeal in 
Pima County, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. App. 1981). In that-case, the court 
also seemed to belittle the adoptive parent's argument that return of 
the child would be emotionally traumatic: 
Any potential emotional trauma to the child if the con-
templated adoption is aborted was engendered by the conduct 
of the adoptive parents not adhering to the mandates of the 
Act. 
Id. at 193. 
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The relevant facts in the present case are quite different and 
distinguishable from Matter of Appeal. In that case the adoptive parent; 
had had custody of the child for only about four months before the nat-
ural mother revoked her relinquishment. In the case at bar, the pe-
titioners had custody of the child for a full two years before there 
was any indication that.the natural mother would revoke her consent to 
the adoption. At that time the child had already developed emotional 
and psychological bonds with the petitioners and it would be unfair to 
punish the child because the adoptive parents did not send him off to 
the reservation immediately upon hearing that the biological mother had 
changed her mind. 
Rehabilitative Efforts 
In the first hearing conducted on April 7, 1983, the natural 
mother testified that the primary care of Jeremiah after the initial 
six month period was with the child's Indian grandmother (Page 20). 
She testified that at the time physical custody of the child was trans-
ferred to the grandmother, the step-father was apparently abusing 
Jeremiah. He did not like the child because it was not his son (Page 
20). In addition, he stated he was not going to bother with the child 
and would not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the child 
the normal love that a father would give a child (Pages 22-23). 
The mother testified that there was only one sister who would take 
the child and she was determined not to be fit (Pages 45-46). 
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The most important testimony concerning the frustrated rehabil-
itation in the case comes from Ms. Ella Shirley. On page 86 of the 
transcript, she explains the shared care concept. In her testimony, 
she stated that if the natural parents could not take care of the child, 
then the extended family would then be charged with the care. Ms. 
Shirley testified specifically that there was a maternal aunt and 
sister who could be used. However, the record clearly indicates the 
unsuitabi lity of all of the extended family. On page 108 of the trans-
cript, the social worker was asked questions as to what decision she 
would have made as far as rehabilitation of the family unit or place-
ment in 1980. Starting on page 109 she was asked that if the facts 
revealed that the members of the extended family who wanted the child 
were not fit custodians, would adoption outside the Tribe be considered. 
The social worker testified that they would simply place the child with 
another Navajo family. The social worker admits based upon those facts, 
rehabilitation with the natural family would have been discontinued and 
the child would have been placed with another Navajo family. The social 
worker agreed that from the notes of the case worker it appeared that 
the natural mother vascilated continually between wanting the child 
back and not wanting the child (Page 112). 
Another social worker testified that the first referral to the 
social agencies was because Jeremiah was neglected (Page 119). The 
social worker stated that "they were interested in taking the child, 
but after doing a thorough investigation of the sisters, we decided 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAGE NINE 
# 19,981 . , 
that placement with those relatives would not work (Page 120). 
Accordingly, the court finds that the burden of rehabilitation and 
working with the family has been met. 
STATE LAW 
In addition to the provisions of the ICWA, the State of Utah has 
set forth certain requirements which must be met before the rights of 
a parent may be terminated. One of the things that satisfy state re-
quirements for termination is abandonment. Utah Code Annotated Sec. 
78-3a-48(1) states in relevant part: 
The court may decree an involuntary termination of all parental 
rights with respect to one or both parents if the court finds . . 
(b) That the parent or parents have abandoned the child. It 
shall be prima facie evidence of abandonment that the parent or 
parents, although having legal custody of the child have sur-
rendered physical custody of the child, and for a period of six 
months following such surrender have not manifested to the child 
or to the person having the physical custody of the child a firm 
intention to resume physical custody or to make arrangements for 
the care of the chiId . . . 
Under, the guidelines laid down by the above statute, the 
natural mother's sustained absence of any showing of interest in the 
child for a two year period establishes prima facie evidence of aban-
donment. 
In State v. J.T, 578 P.2d 831 (Utah 1978) the State Division 
of Family Services had placed children of the litigant mother in 
foster homes after she had released them to the agency. Despite her 
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attempts to remain in contact with her children, the state refused to 
tell her where the two youngest were. Consequently, she had no contact 
with them for two and one-half years. Eventually, when the mother 
sought custody of the children, the State sought to terminate her 
parental rights on the basis of abandonment. The Supreme Court found 
that there could be no abandonment where everytime the parent sought to 
see the children she was denied visitation. 
In the case before the court, the mother knew that the petitioners 
had the child and at all times relevant to this action their phone 
number and address were 1isted in the telephone directory, nevertheless, 
she made no attempt to contact the child. 
Conclusion 
In light of the foregoing, the court finds 1) that the evidence 
(including expert testimony) established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that to return Jeremiah to his Indian custodians would result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to him; 2) that active efforts have been 
undertaken to attempt the rehabilitation of the Indian family and have 
failed; and 3) that the biological mother knowingly and voluntarily 
abandoned the child as defined in Utah Code Annoted Sec. 78-3a-48(l). 
Accordingly, the amended petition of adoption is granted. 
Dated this JL}1? day of January, 1985. 
/JLz^uL^-
DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Mr. Richard Johnson 
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H4LL0WAY, Jeremiah F?2-H7 
I Tanning on movinr next door to 1 he :;o'<nh ho.-jn, ,",he is rjvinr, her prwvnt 
home to Art & Cecelia, 
In conversing with Art & Cecelia they still rant to try and /*et Jeremiah 
back. They feel that they are willing to continue with the present situation 
in court. In terms of whether they had sought help from there NAC. The 
family was still planning this. They still would like Mr. Yazzie, myself 
and Mr. Dorsay to participate in this ritual0 They feel that this can 
better prepare all of us emotional. Cecelia has deep hopes of Jeremiah 
returning, with their home. Jeremiah and his little brother will be roomed 
in their own room. The Saunders are now looking for furnitures. 
lb 
C. Saunders came into office with family. In our meeting we discussed the 
importance of getting an evaluation 6n the family. It was suggested that Cecelia 
and Arthur have a psychological evaluation completed to determined there 
capability as parents. The response from the Saunders was positive. They are 
willing to come into Gallup to met with any psychologist to begin the evalua-
tion. It was also suggested that the psychologist make a homevisit and visit 
with the family do better determine their ability to be good parents. 
The family was also interested in knowing whether contact was made with 
another psychologist to testify in court. Unfortunately the Psych., Dr. 
Dorsay had contacted did not want to testify against the LDS Church. He 
is a strong adovate for placement Indian children in Indian homes, but 
does not want to testify against the church. (It was learned he is a 
follower of the Morman belief). Presently.Mr. Dorsay is trying to locate 
another Psych, that may be able to helP us. The Saunders want to be in-
formed of any further information that may come up. 
lb 
The Saunders.were in the office today. They were wondering if any court date 
had been set. I was not familiar with a date. The Saunders were also wanted. 
to know if any arrangements have been made for the Psychological evaluation. 
Presently they have gotten a new car and are able to make any appointment. 
I had attempted to contact Dr. Thomas, but learned he was on training in 
Albuquerque. Worker will contact Dr. Thomas next week to refer evaluation to 
him. The Saunders are also planning on have a prayer meeting for Jeremiah 
possible in mid July. Arthur and his mother are planning on traveling in to 
Texas to pick up some medicine for the up coming meeting. The family will be 
free anytime after the week of the 18th. Worker will notified the family when 
arrangements are made. 
The Saunders a very difficult time, she made them bring in a list of jobs, 
they had looked into. The family will be recieveing $T36.00 every two (2) 
weeks. Their initial grant is $217.00. 
And finally, the family would like for Mr Dorday to make a home visit. They 
want for him to see how they have prepared for Jeremiah's return. Worker 
will contact Dorsay 
lb 
Worker met with Dr. Thomas and Dr. Muller on possibilities of providing 
evaluation of the family (Saunder). Both Dr's. were relunctant to testify 
in court of the stability of the Saunder family. They felt that it would 
be unfair to testify en behalf of 1-H0 ^ - T - — J Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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wh^t.rmy (1r,v-loped l a t e r , ns a resu l t of Cocci in1;; f-uujly hi.-; ory. i\>i h 
Lr 'n . do not v;nnt to t es t i fy in court , they fee] Uj;il t h i s type of 
s i tua t ion i s not //ood for t he i r profession. 1 ask for names of other 
possible contacts . Worker wil l look i n t o these contacts , 
lb 
10.P3 Home visit made with Mr. Yazzie. He spoke with Cecelia and briefed her 
on what to expect from Utah..He also reassured her that she really did 
not have much to worry about. Mr. Yazzie has strong feelings of getting 
this case transferred. Cecelia's first choice was that of guardianship 
she wanted contact with the child. Uer second choice was to have him return 
should they decide not to go with her terms.- It was now understood that 
her case would be contested0 Cecelia seem confident with her choic of 
remain steadfast to getting Jeremiah return. 
22-83 Worker made home vist to remind Mrs. Saunders that I will be coming by 
early Thursday morning, to pick her up. we will be returning Saturday 
morning. Cecelia still has hope that her child will be returned. 
24-83 == Arrived Ms. Saunders' home at 8:30 AM begin, trip to Prove. Most of our 
talk covered issues of Cecelia's childhood. Arrive Provo, 6:30 PM. Cecelia 
had little money, so we spend the night in the same room. No one was 
contacted at the court house as our arrival. 
lb 
55-83 ' Hearing, present at the hearing were the Carters, Jeremiah Halloway, 
Polly Ann Dick, Larry K Yazzie, Cecelia Saunders and myself. (Prior to 
our meeting, I contacted the court house and learned the hearing had been moved 
up to 1:30 PM)e 
In grief Mr. Johnson, sttorney for the Carters, argued issues involving 
abandonment and domcile. Mr. Yazzie!s respons'e.was rather neverously 
exhabit, he had one real through answer for Mr. Johnson's comments 
regarding domicle. Both Mr.. Yazzie and myself felt that this would become 
an issue long before appearing in court0 Questions regarding how does the 
Tribe define domocile? Is domocile that of the natural mother? As a 
result, Johnson left good points to retain jursicdiction, especially 
with the question's regarding where is the domicle of the child. In 
essence, Mr. Yazzie fail to define the tribes terms of domicle. In 
close the Honorable Sam gave ten (10) to response to the issues 
developed from this hearing. At that time he will determine wheather "Good 
Cause" is evident to retain jursidiction. Upon learning of his decision, 
we shall either: 
1. Make arrangements to return Jeremiah or 
2. Request for an Evidenary Hearing to dtermine final status of Jeremiah* 
Upon closure, Cecelia was only able to see Jeremiah, she was unable to 
talk or hold him. From viewing Jeremiah he appears to be in good care. 
He is tall and chubby, he held fast to his custodian. The family seems 
to be very closeo Cecelia broken down and cried as she watched them from 
a very short distance. It was evident that Cecelia felt bad of not 
being able to see or talke with Jeremiah. 
Both client and worker left almost immediately after the hearing. Ke ^ 
return to Iyanbito at 11:00 PM. • lb 
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RICHARD B. JOHNSON, FOR: 
HOWARD. LEWIS 8c PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 EAST 3 0 0 NORTH STREET 
P O BOX 778 
PROVO. UTAH 84603 
TELEPHONE 373-6345 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : SUMMARY OF TRIBAL RECORDS 
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY, DOB: 5/14/77 
A person under eighteen years : 
of age. Probate No. 199810 
COME NOW the petitioners Dan and Patricia Carter and submit the 
following summary of the Social Worker file and exhibits previously 
submitted to petitioners' counsel in answers to interrogatories. 
Initially/ it should be noted that in making the summary/ the peti-
tioners continue to object to the tribe's failure to mark and have 
introduced as exhibits the records as they existed at the time of 
the court hearing as opposed to submitting typed substitutes which 
contain many disparities and omissions from that originally submitte 
to the Court. 
1. Jeremiah Halloway was born on May 14/ 1977 and is an 
enrolled Navajo child/ C#427,273. 
2. In a home visit on January 23/ 1982/ Cecilia Saunders/ the 
natural mother of Jeremiah/ admitted that she gave her son Jeremiah 
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away to her mother Bessie Begay in order to save her marriage with 
Arthur Saunders. Cecilia also stated that she did not provide any 
monetary or any other type of support to Jeremiah. Cecilia also 
stated that Arthur/ the step-father* disliked Jeremiah very much. 
3. In a home visit to Rosita Dick/ a sister of Cecilia/ on 
January 23/ 1980/ Rosita stressed that it wouldn't be a good idea 
to give custody of Jeremiah to Bessie Begay/ her mother/ because of 
her drinking problem. Rosita suggested that there were three 
sisters who were interested in obtaining legal custody of Jeremiah. 
However/ the social worker indicated that all three seemed to be 
ineligible due to age or other reason. During that same visit the 
case worker spoke with Bessie Begay who stated that she had adopted 
two grandchildren in the past who were children of Minnie Williams. 
She also stated there were fifteen members in the same household. 
4. In a report of January 23/ 1980/ a referral was made to the 
tribe's social agencies indicating that Jeremiah was being neglected] 
by his mother/ Cecilia Saunders. The child was reported to be 
constantly on the go with both grandparents on their sheep herding 
job/ that Bessie had a drinking problem and that there were fifteen 
members living in the same household. 
5. In a home visit on March 19/ 1980/ Bessie Begay indicated 
that Jeremiah had been with them since birth/ contrary to the 
natural mother's testimony that the care was given to the grandmothejr 
at six months. 
-2-
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6 • On Ap r i 1 3 0 ,- 19 8 0 ; t h e s oc i a 1 wo r ke r wa s i n f or me d t ha t 
J e r e m i a h w a s t a k e n f r o m B e s s i e ' s h o in e b y P o ] 1 y I) i c I :: D i I r :i n :j 11 a t 
v i s i t / C e c i 2 i a
 f t h e i i a t u i: a 1 n:i o 11 :i e • r o f J e r e m i a h s t a t e 3 11 i a t s h e 1 i a :il 
given her consent to Pol ly,, her sister/ to go ahead and place 
Jerem i a i i i n a £ o ster ho m e i i :t I J t a I: i H a r :i : e a s o n f <:: i: rin. a ] ;: ::i i :t :j 1 1 :i i , s 
d e c i s i o n was due t o " B e s s i e Begay * s d r i n k i n g pr ob 1 ein. Ai i o t h e r f a c t 
w a r r a n t i n g C e c i 1 i a ' s d e c i s i o n was 11 ia t Cec i 1 i a h e r s e ] f cou1d n o t 
k e e p J e i: a iit i a 1 :t :ii i i 1 :i B I: c l i s t o d} " b e c a i i s e 11 :i e • :::: 1 i :ii II ::I A a s n • * g 1 e c t e :ii a i :t fil 
a b u s e d by 1 i e r t i u s b a n d ; Ar t ! iu r S a u n d e r s . 
i: , T h e c a s e w o r k e r ' s n o t e f o r M. a y 2 # 1 9 8 0' i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e 
g r a n d in o 1:1: :i e i: B e s s i e c o i 11 i i :t i :i a s t o a b \ :i s e a 1 c :> 1 i c • ] S h o r 1:1 y 1:1 I e r e a f 1: e r 
a c a s e w o r k e i: r e p o r t i n d i c a t e s t h a t a 1 1 o £ t h e f a m i 1 y r e 1 a t i v e s 
of Jeremiah were unstab1e except for the To 1 ths. 
8 11 i a T :ii 1 1 • =>' 1 [ 1 [ ::  J :li • = i I t: s e r :ii :: e p • ] a I :t ::i a t a :3 P, i n g i i s t # 19 8 0 # :i 1: 
i s re por ted tha t Jeremi a h f s wa s a ch i 1 d i: i.e gI ec t ca se
 lf tha t Ce c1.1 ia 
and Ar thu r were i lot ver y s t a b l e and that C e c i l i a had s i g n e d a consen 
f<::: : :: p • ] acei nei it 
9 . o i :i 0 c t o b e r 21., 19 8 0 / t h e h :> in e v I s i t r e p o r t i n d i c a t e s t h a t: 
C e c i 1 i a r e p o r t e d t h a t J e r e m i a h h a d b e e n p 1 a c e d i n a n L D S f o s t e r 
in a :: i i E , ;; e • a :i : i: • :> i 11 , ::i I : • a s i s T1: :i € • v : • ::i : ] : a i: a :i3 \ i s a • ::l C e c i 1 i a t o g e t a 
copy of hi s p 1 a c e m e n t v e r i f i c a 1 1 . o i i 11 i s a 1 s o r e p o r t e d by t h e 
worker t h a t C e c i 1 i a a1mo s t g ave n i p he r s o n Je re m i ah f o r ado p t i c 
. € • 11 ;i e i :i s a j s t il :;t a. t C a c i ] i a s t a 1: * • ::i 11: I a t " t h e N a v a j o I" r i b e w . „. d n 
-: * 1 ':w ,e r I ' I I M n [it« i »s no t c o m p l e t e d and t h e n e x t p a g e d o e s 
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n o t e x i s t i n t h e r e c o r d . 
1 0 11: s h o i 11 d b e i n d i c a t e d t h a t a ] t h o u g h n o t i n c ] u d e d i n t h e 
r e c o r d s • ::: f 11: :i =>* 1: i : i t 5 > • 1 1 = ::: 1: :t i ] :3 ::: a m € > t ::) I J t a I i • ::> i i JVI a ::i : :: I in 2 3 , • ] 9 8 0 c :i fil 
t h a t C e c i 1 i a s i g n e d t h e C o n s e n t f or A d o p t i o n i n Utah on May 30 ,, 1 98 0 
J ] » T h e s o c i a 1 w o r k e r ' s r e p o r t: o f D e c e m b e r 8 ] 9 8 0 i n d i c a t e s 
t h a t J e i! • =» in i a 1 :t i s presently res i d i n g 4 i 11 i I) a i i a n d P a t C a i: t: e r i n 
Spanish Fork and that Cecil ia Saunders had put him up for adoption 
to be a ::Iopted b;; the Ca r t:e r co\ ip] e T1 :te I :itc: 1:• s i :i :idI. :::a t:es 11 :;ta!:: Ceci ] i a 
had i n d i c a t e d that the chi 1 • :3 1 iad b e e n p 1 a c e d ii i a Mormoi i f o s t e r 
p 1 a c e in e n t i n P r o v o / U t a h o n a y e a r r o u n d b a s i s b u t i t v» a s 1 e a r n e 3 
1:1 :t a t s 1 :t 2 1 i a • fill j: • i 1 1 1 1 :t a :::  1: i ::i Ill • fill ' i j : £ ::: r <= ,. • fill o p« t i :: i :i S :ii i :i c 2 ] • s a r i i i i :t g a 1: ::: • \ :i t 
t h e s i t u a t i o n / IC WA 1 \ a s i n t e r v e ne d . 11 i 11 i e a ssessme n t p o r t i o n o £ 
t h a t n o t e i t I, n d I, c a t e s t h a t C e c i 1 i a s t i 1 ] w a n t s t o c < :::»n t i n I :i e w i 11 i 
1:1 :t • =! ::: I i i Il • fill i i i ::: r fill 51: I: ::: s a a I l • EI r ITI a r r i a g e ;, «. ::i Ill: I i 1 11: S a i it i :i • f ii e i: s 
On December 1 # 1 9 8 0 / a home visit w a s m a d e to C e c i l i a l s 
i s c -v -a t h y D i 1 g a r i t o. 11 i t h a t 1 i ::) in e v i s i t # i t w a s 1 e a r n e d t h a t 
:
 - ' cl o i i e 11 :t =•!'• s a rn e 11 :i i i :;i :j C e c: :i ] :ii a i s d :: :ii i it g I I a 11 i ;:r I: l a d g i v e i :i i i p 
: r J r ^  e h e r c h 1 1 d r e i i t o s a v e h e r ITI a r r i a g e w i t h R a 1 p 1 i. K a t h y f s t h r e 
-~i;d • • were be i ng rai sed and takei i c a r e o f by an a i ,i 11 i n Mari a n o 
e i I c • t e a j s • :: r e p :::> r t: s t h a t C a- c i ] i a |! s o t! I • ?, i: s i s t e r , 1 1 :i i :i i • * 
W i l l i e i s a l s o s t a y i n g ther : e s h a c k i n g up w i t h a g u y . 
1 3 . T h e n o t e £ o r D e c e m b e r 2 # J! 9 8 0
 f i n d i c a t e s 11 a t 11 i e w o r k e r 
;
 •  a i:li i i e ::i! t o Z e • ::: i ] i a "I: I i 3 1 :ii t r a s in. a fill e J ;: i • :: • ; 11 i t :: 11 t e i* : r k • = • :;i : 1:1 a , t 
C e c 11 i a h a d p u t J e r e rn i a h u p £ o r a d o p t i o n . C e c i 1 i a w a s v e r y u p s e t 
- 1 _ 
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to hear about this since she had been telling the worker a different 
w u r c c s -: 11 c 3 t e s t n a t . d - -•> th 
i * '- r v-: n tion i r ? -
o I.I was f 
JA. was Lne rid tur -
Q O Q nni" V T Q H fn 
jmmenLeo end 
oreanant vi 
:njicat- l t.\d" Frnest Y: 
* i trier ui jereinian ^ 
^ r annf ta^e custoc, 
" v : . * s * - r -: i i :* . *'::v 
. *- i i XZ O I 
; n •= a z z i e -
^ o
 t ^ i c / ., r «. 
i d * , r. d ~ ' i t I' ^ ! 
' e r a u v . 
L e e i : M l ! . . . 
17 
18 
191 
_ _ u * ^ 
v 11 h 
! * ". J 1 
i i ; e 5 wpen 
1 4 . 
' V 
T I ;i~ r i n : u r . -j 
w J , - i inO t . i *r I C i l d H J[ t: u I f * . n i ' . T *. v j . •: ^ t : . 2 \\ i . i 1 
a n d M r s • J i m ro y "T o 11 h a n d d e c i d e d t c r e t u i: n J e r e m i a h b a c k t o h e r 
in :> 11 i e r B e s s i e B e eg a y # r e eg a r ! :i 1 e s s • :> f I: :t • = • i : • fill, i: ::i i 1 k i i 1 g p • i : • ::> I::: ] =; ITI S 
15. Ii i ai i ICWA case update report dated January 20/ 1981
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io diiu uidi. sne nau L- "inaren uy net 
mari-i.: -c/ «.•_•.,•« ..-, : :;.v,a 'binders. The note .. _,icates <-hj»t 
Arthur Saunders, the step-father/ could not accept Jeremiah as his 
step-child. The report says that Cecilia gave consent to Polly-
Dick to place the child in Utah for several reasons. The first 
reason was that Bessie wasn't able to take care of the child because 
she abuses alcohol heavily. The second reason the child was given 
to Bessie was to save her marriage with Arthur Saunders. She 
reported that Arthur dislikes the child very much/ that he often 
abuses and neglects the child which Cecilia cannot tolerate. Cecili 
could not tolerate seeing her child being hurt. • The report conclude 
that Cecilia Saunders is from a big family. She has several sisters 
but all are unstable and do not have a house of their own. In 
fact, they have done the same thing, they have given up their childr 
to save their marriages. They all don't seem to show any interest 
in the child. In a proposed draft letter to Cecilia Saunders, the 
natural mother of the child, the case worker explicitly asked 
Cecilia whether or not she still consents to allowing the Carters 
t remiah. 
16 In a prottctivt- s-?:v] .-.- report dated Mar.-"* 2". ""-I, 
tact was made with ' - - " - c => u ^  i--r - * *-••-.- • *--, • *• c • -.. 
on I y Mm i elativ* . ia 
refuses to give up the child to this certain relative due to personal 
-6-
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r e a s o n s . The r e p o r t s a y s Ce c i 1 1 a s 111 1 wan t s t h e c h11d t o rema I n 
w i 1I i t h e C a r t e r s I n 01 a h i> s h e d o e s n o t w a n t t h e c h i ] d t o r e 11 i r i i t: o 
e ii e s e r v a t :i ::; i i I: • i 1 1 : :ii f 1: :i 2 s I: i o I 11 • :i:I r EE 1: i it i: i t s I i e w a n t s 1 :i i in p 1 a c e d b a c k 
- ; t h h I s m a t e r n a 1 g r a n d m o t h e r r e g a r d l e s s o f h e r d r I, n k I n g p r o b 1 e m s 
3 n d u n s t a b 3 e n e s s . 
] 7 T1 i« =! IC \ 11 i i l a r r a 11 v e f o r M a r c I i 2 3 # 3 9 81 11 i d I c a t e s t h a t 
: e c i 11 a s t i 11 h a s h e r in I n d s e t o n 3 e 111 n g t h e C a r t e r s a d • :::> j: t J e r e m i a h 
She d o e s w a n t t ::  : : ons Ide i : I:he To 1 11 is t :> t a k e ci :isto• :i;;r ::  f I: I • E E r ::: 1 i t i Ill ::i 
j u e t ^ p e r s o n a l r c j ^ ^ r 11, . ~^ a s i t in I g h t 1 e a d t o a f a m 11 y c o n f 1 . 
-. p n .^ ^ i V f .-.;; e s : a ; r 1 t ha t i f J e r e m i a h s h om 3 • 3 e ve r be 
r • s 1 l e a i I t s I :i i m n e 11 :;i r i l e • ;:I t • ::  1:1: :i e in a t <E 
. L a i i J . . i e : , _ c *.- ^ i K7 i : c^a ) L r - j a r d l e s s o f h e r d r I n k I n g p r o b 1 e in s e. 
. e c i h a wo s r ^ f i e r r u d e i n d i s c u s s i n g t h e c h i l d f s • » b a , * -r o ^ 
The r ^ — r t f-r ^^rch 25/ 3 981 i ndicates that the worker 
•ir;n:i^ advisee a c a ; * r -.-: i r n I n g t h e c h i 1 d t o Bess i e B e g a y b e c a u s e 
: Jl a 1: • l I s • = • i g a i i i 1:1: i e i :t :: • t EE S t a t: e s t: I I a t 
•2. „ ^  i discussing Jeremiah . 
19, The note for March 26 # 1981 indicates that Ceci J ia got 
m a d a f i 1 h II i l l i« i I I m II i ?i : ::: • i :t] ;;:r i i i f = i :it: l: a 1: j ai :i ii ] eill: t 1:1 :t• EE • :: 1:1: : ,e:i : J! :ii 1 1 1 &. 
rt
 i r I h o 111 k-j, T h e n o t e t u t " A p r i 3 11! 3 3 9 8 -II! ii n d i c a t e s t h a t C e c i 3 i a h a • 3 
come home two days later after she t ::»ok off. 
/ i ) I  I I I I I I I i M 1 i II I ! I II 11 i III I II II | | i I I i i i l { 
"*
v
"? *" I. J e r e m i a h r e m a i n i n t h e 1 j s t e r home w i t h t h e C a r t e r s ami 
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if she s h o u 1 d r e t u r n t o t 1 :ie r e s e r v a t i o n s h e w a n t s J e r e m i a h r e t u r n e d 
I i !! i i 111 f I in f i SI i e :! c e s i i o t w a i 11 11 ;t e T c • 1 11 i s t :: 1 :t a ^  e h i rn b e :: a u s e e 
* 11 s t i 11 be ar ound 1 iis s t e p - f a ther TI ie g r a n d m o ther a 1 s o w a n t s 
• im back but she abuses alcohol quite frequently and is not stable. 
e g r a i d in < :: 11 :t e r I: e • :i " 3 • 3 s 1: i e e p f :: :i : 3 i f f e r e n t j: e o p 1 e a • 3 i s I , • : • 1: a 1 a y s 
home whi ch wou 1 d in ter £ ere w1.1h the chi 1 d ! s educa t ion . T1 ie i io te 
concludes that Ceci 1 ia was quite confi :ised• 
2 1 . T I: :i e p i: ::) t e c t :i > e s =J r :i ::  e i: • =i p :: i: t: :!: ::  r S e p t e m)::: e r 3 0 .1 9 8 Jl 
i ndicates Ceci1ia continues to refuse to give her consent to have 
J"eremiah p 1 aced wi t h the To 11hs due to per sona 1 reasons • 
2 2 11: = • i :i :: 1: € £ :: i : 0 c t c: 1: e • r 8 ] 9 8 ] :ii 1:1: 11: • =i s o :: :ii a ] i :: • u : J : e • :i : ::i i :t 3 i 
c a t e s t h a t, C e c i 1 i a d o e s n o t f e e 1 c o in f o r t a b 1 e t a. 1 k i n g a b o u t J e r e m i a h 
b e c a u s e I i e r h u s b a n d d i s 1 1, k e s a n d m i s t r e a t s J e r e m i a h a ] o t a c c o r d i n g 
t :) C e c I ]; I, a 01: • s 2 r j i i :i g f i : • :: ITIII |: • a s I: I: :t <:::::: i ri e :ii s i t s # 11: :t e ::: a s • » » :: • r k e i: s t a t e d| 
that Cecilia dreads to have tl le socia 1 worker come to see her about 
h e r s o n T h e c a s e w o r k e r d e t e r m i n e s t h a 1: b y t h e e x p r e s s i o n :::> i i t II: :i • 2 
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Jeremiah or let him return to her maternal grandmother, Bessie 
Begay. 
24. In a letter dated March 22, 1982 to Richard Maxfield, 
attorney at law from Lauren Bernally, a social worker, the letter 
states that Cecilia's reason for consenting to the adoption is that 
her present spouse has not accepted Jeremiah as a step-son. He has 
rejected Jeremiah since his initial meeting with Cecilia. The 
letter states explicitly that "to complicate things more, she could 
no longer tolerate the harsh treatment Arthur exhibited towards 
her son, Jeremiah." The letter states that on almost every occasion 
of social worker visits, Cecilia has changed her mind, her reasons 
are somewhat easily swayed by different family members. The letter 
states that she is beginning to resent the somewhat "pestering" visi 
with the social worker and spends more time away from home to avoid 
contacts. 
25. The case worker's note for March 19, 1982 indicates that 
the immediate family of Jeremiah have developed feelings of not 
wanting to talk with the case worker. 
26. On September 1, 1982, Cecilia mentioned to the case 
worker that it would also be very difficulty financially for them 
to take Jeremiah back. They have no money. Later in the discus-
sion, the cas worker learned that Cecilia was fearful of continuing 
with the hearing. Cecilia felt that she could not give Jeremiah 
the things that the Carters gave him. Cecilia recalled the way 
-9-
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Jeremiah appeared at the court hearing and how well dressed he was. 
Most strikingly/ Cecilia recalled seeing Jeremiah and Pat Carter 
walking out holding hands and Jeremiah referring to her as mom. 
27. On September 1, 1982/ the social worker noted that Cecilia] 
was torn and confused and appears to be backing out. 
28. On September 17/ 1982/ Cecilia indicated to the social 
worker that she had really thought about Jeremiah for the past week 
and decided to go ahead and have the Carters adopt him. Cecilia 
indicated that they felt that they did not the return because 
Jeremiah was better situated in Utah. Cecilia recalled the day she 
had spent in placement. She felt Jeremiah would be able to become 
better educated and possibly do more for himself. Cecilia's thoughtj 
of placement with another Indian family were not too good. She 
felt Jeremiah had established ties and to remove him would cause him| 
more harm. 
29. During the months of 1983/ the social working office 
tried to contact various experts to testify as to the stability of 
the Saunders family. The first doctor contacted did not want to 
testify. Thereafter/ contact was made with Dr. Thomas and Dr. 
Muller on providing an evaulation of the Saunders family. Both 
doctors were reluctant to testify in court of the stability of the 
Saunders family. They felt that it would be unfair to testify on 
behalf of the family and not be able to express what might develop 
later as a result of Cecilia's family history. Both doctors indicatje 
-10-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
£T E 
0 in 
uix 
^ £ 
II 
c 
u 
o
o 
Q n 
z ^  
< V) 
W Ui 
p 
m m 
to a 
OD « <£> 
K « n 
s< n 
m t: UJ 3
 z 
°o? 
o. > o. 
0 «j 
? ™ 
0- H 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
they did not want to testify in court. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated initially/ it should be noted that there are a great 
many records which are still not in the Court's file. There are 
large gaps in time when there are no social worker notes and there 
are references to reports that are not in the file. Accordingly/ 
petitioners are simply submitting a summary of the documents that 
have now been submitted and certainly not attesting at to their 
completeness or their similarity to the original documents previous 
submitted to the Court. 
DATED this day of October, 1984. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON, FOR: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing SUMMARY OF TRIBAL RECORDS to 
Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan and Mr. Craig Dorsay, Attorneys for the Navajo 
Nation, at Provo, Utah this 22nd day of October, 1984. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ttffl 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION 
SUMMARY OF PRIOR TESTIMONY 
OF JEREMIAH HALLOWAY, 
DOB: 5/14/77 
A person under eighteen years 
of age. Probate No. 19981 
COME NOW the petitioners and give the following summary of the 
testimony offered by the witnesses in prior hearings in this case. 
All references are to the transcript page numbers. 
CECILIA DICK SAUNDERS TESTIMONY 
1. Cecilia testified that she was in foster placement in Utah 
from the third grade to the eleventh grade (p. 17/ lines 14-23). 
2. Cecilia testified that the natural father of Jeremiah was 
Ernest Yazzie/ Jr. and that the child was born May 14/ 1977 in 
Gallop, New Mexico (p. 18/ lines 17-22). 
3. Cecilia testified that the initial care of the child was 
given by her mother/ Bessie Begay (p. 19/ lines 4-8). Cecilia did 
testify that she had access to the child up to the time he was six 
years of age (p. 19/ lines 11-14). 
4. Cecilia testified that during the initial six months/ she 
lived with her mother/ Bessie Begay and her step-father/ Jack Begay 
(p. 19/ line 15 to p. 20/ line 5). After the six month period, 
Cecilia started seeing Arthur Saunders and did not live with her 
mother and stayed either at Arthurfs house or at her house (p. 20/ 
lines 2-14). 
5. Cecilia testified that she married Arthur Saunders in 
July of 1978 but could not remeber the date (p. 20/ lines 18-19). 
6. Cecilia testified that the primary care of Jeremiah after 
the initial six month period was with her mother/ Bessie Begay, 
(p. 20/ lines 20-23). Additionally, that Bessie Begay and Jack 
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Begay had a drinking problem (p. 20/ line 24 through p. 21/ line 2). 
7. Cecilia testified that at the time physical custody of the 
child was transferred to the grandmother/ the step-father/ Arthur 
Saunders was apparently abusing Jeremiah. Arthur didn't like the 
child because he wasn't his son (p. 20/ lines 3-23). In addition/ 
Arthur stated that he was not going to bother with the child and 
would not care for or support Jeremiah and would not give the child 
the normal love that a father would give a child (p. 22/ line 23 
through p. 23/ line 9). 
8. Cecilia testified there were times when the social workers 
found the child left unattended because Bessie was drunk (p. 23/ 
lines 21-25). Cecilia testified that when Bessie would drink she 
O'V 
would go an alcoholic binge for a week (p. 23/ lines 7-9). Cecilia 
*\ 
testified that Jack Begay/ her step-father/ had the same drinking 
problem and accordingly never assumed any care of the child (p. 24/ 
lines 10-15). 
9. The only contact Cecilia had with the child from the time 
Jeremiah was six months of age on is when the child would be brought 
over for approximately two to three days at Arthur's house every 
two or three weeks (p. 25/ lines 4-8 and p. 26/ lines 22-25). 
10. Two of Cecilia's six sisters, Rosita and Polly complained 
of the care that Jeremiah was receiving (p. 28/ lines 2-6 and p. 20/ 
lines 14-19). 
11. Polly reported to Cecilia that she had found the child 
with Jack Begay who was drunk and that Jeremiah hadn't eaten. Polly 
was unsure as to the number of days that Jeremiah had not eaten 
(p. 30/ lines 13-14). Cecilia testified that Polly got her consent 
to take the child (p. 42/ lines 11-12). In addition/ Bessie/ the 
grandmother knew what had happened to the child (p. 42/ lines 19-20). 
12. Cecilia testified unequivocably that she did not object to 
the child being taken to Utah and that she thought it was in the 
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best interest'of the child to go to Utah (p. 31/ lines 19-23). In 
addition/ Cecilia told Polly adoption was alright inasmuch as was a 
subject they had talked about for along period of time (p. 32/ 
lines 13-20) . 
13. Cecilia understood the consent to adoption when she signed 
it (p. 32/ line 20-25 through p. 33/ line 9). Cecilia testified 
two years after the child was taken to Utah/ she was contacted by 
the Tribe who said that Jeremiah could not be adopted out of state 
(p. 35/ lines 3-4). Cecilia was asked if she really wanted to give. 
Jeremiah up for adoption and she answered that question by saying 
/ \K yes (p.35/ lines 8-11). 
14. Finally/ Cecilia said there was only one sister who would 
take the child and that was Minie and she was determined not to be 
fit (p. 45/ line 20 through p. 46/ line 2). 
POLLY DICK TESTIMONY 
1. Polly testifed that the child was passed to different 
people consisting of sisters/ her mom/ etc. (p. 57/ lines 19-20). 
2. Polly testified that when she picked Jeremiah up the child 
had a T-shirt and underwear and that was all (p. 58/ lines 8-17). 
At the time she picked up the child/ Jack Begay/ the step-father told 
Polly that nobody takes care of the kid and to take them away 
(p. 58/ lines 18-20). 
3. Polly indicated that no one in the family ever resisted the 
adoption (p. 59/ line 25). 
4. Polly testified that Cecilia had told her that when the 
Tribe contacted her to get Jeremiah back that they told Jeremiah was 
going to be back on the reservation or they would put her in jail 
(p. 60/ line 23 through p. 20 through p. 61/ line 3). 
DAN CARTER TESTIMONY 
1. Dan Carter testified that when the child came to Utah/ he 
had a viral skin infection and poor dental care (p. 71/ lines 7-14). 
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that he would cover his head when you would raise your hand and tnat 
he had a habit of begging for money (p. 72/ lines 9-16)• Finally/ 
Dan testified the child appeared to be very insecure (p. 73/ lines 
3-13). 
SOCIAL WORKERS TESTIMONY 
1. Most of the testimony of the'social workers is set out in 
the summary of the social worker file attached hereto. Other than 
that/ their testimony has been previously submitted to the court in 
the form of petitioners1 motion for sanctions. In addition to that* 
testimony/ Lauren Bernally/ testified that they could not have 
placed Jeremiah in the homes of Arlene/ Minnie/ and Rosita who were 
Cecilia's sisiters after doing the homestudy evaluations because 
they were not felt to be proper custodians (p. 128/ lines 1-4). 
Although Lauren testified there were assessments of the family done/ 
those assessments did not appear in any of the files presented to 
the Court (p. 133/ lines 14-18). Finally/ Lauren Bernally did not 
have any excuse for the termination of the note on 11-17-82 (p. 145/ 
lines 23-25). 
DATED this day of October/ 1984. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON/ FOR: 
HOWARD/ LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing SUMMARY OF PRIOR TESTIMONY 
to Ms. Mary Ellen Sloan and Mr. Craig Dorsay# at Provo/ Utah/ dated 
this 22nd day of October, 1984. 
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Jtoled $, cHov&, <Pk?b. 
Diplomate in Clinical Psychology 
American Board of Professional Psychology 
Diplomate in Forensic Psychology 
American Board of Forensic Psychology 
October 17, 1984 
Richard B. Johnson, Esquire 
Howard, Lewis and Petersen 
120 East 300 North Street 
Post Office Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Dan and Patricia Carter v. Navajo Tribal Council in reference to 
Jeremiah Halloway, aka Michael Chad Carter 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
In response to your referral, I have examined Jeremiah Halloway, and Dan 
and Patricia Carter in reference to the dispute between the Carters and 
the Navajo Indian Council over the right for the Carters to have custody of 
Jeremiah. As you know, Jeremiah is called by the Carters, Michael Chad 
Carter. Indeed, he does not know his name, Jeremiah. Therefore, I will 
refer to him in this report as Michael. In conducting this examinatiion, I 
interviewed both Mr. and Mrs. Carter, and I administered to them the 
Bipolar Psychological Inventory, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, 
both of which are objective personality tests, and the Shipley Institute of 
Living Scale, which is an intelligence test. I gave Michael the Rorschach 
Ink Blot Test, the ChildrenTs Apperception Test, and the Bender Gestalt 
Perceptual Motor Test. It is my understanding that I will have the 
opportunity to review the test protocols from Dr. Samual Roll who examined 
Michael for the Navajo Tribal Council. You provided me a copy of his 
report, and I will refer to this report later. 
I asked a doctoral graduate student, Emily Fallis, to administer to Michael 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Revised Edition, and I asked 
another graduate student, Lura Tibbitts-Kleber, who is doing her doctoral 
research on parental attachment under my direction, to provide me a 
summary of the affect of removing a child from his "psychological parents." 
I will attach a copy of her summary to this report. In addition, I talked to 
the three school teachers that Michael has had, a Linda Coray, who was his 
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kindergarten teacher during the school year, 1982-83, to Patricia Farrer, 
who was Michael's first grade teacher during the school year 1983-84, and 
to Virginia Hansen, who is Michael's present second grade teacher. I also 
talked to Mrs. Ann Carter, the mother of Dan Carter, to Mr. Albert 
Hawkins, the father of Patricia Carter. 
I talked to Mrs. Marian Seamons, a person who lives in Orem, Utah, and 
who with her husband, have had a number of Indian children live in their 
homes, to Mr. and Mrs. Melvin Carter, (no relationship to Dan and Patricia) 
who have also had a number of Indian children living in their home. I also 
asked Mr. Paul Buckingham, who is a social worker, and who has worked 
with Indian children placements to examine the family. I will attach his 
report. 
As you know, I asked that you try to arrange for me to interview Cecelia 
Ann Dick Sanders, Michael's biological mother, but apparently this could not 
be arranged. I also would have liked to have talked to Michael's maternal 
aunt, Polly, but the Carters have been unable to provide me with a 
telephone number for her. At this point, I have spent in excess of twelve 
hours in interviewing these people, and testing them as indicated above, and 
in scoring the tests and synthesizing the material, and dictating the report. 
I told all the people I interviewed that I had been retained by you, and you 
in turn, are working for the Carters. I will, first, present the material that 
I have gathered, and then, I will offer some opinions and recommendations 
in this case. 
ISSUE: 
It is my understanding that the court will be considering only one question 
which is raised by the Indian Child Welfare Act, which in paragraph F, 
states: 
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such 
proceeding in the absence of a determination, supported by 
evidence beyond a resonable doubt, including testimony of 
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the 
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 
As I read Dr. Roll's report, it seems to me that the issue revolves around 
the possible damage that will be done to Michael, should he be taken from 
the Carter home, versus (to quote from Dr. Roll's report) "if Jeremiah stays 
with the Carters, he will likely to continue to try to be more and more 
white by hating Indians. When he becomes an adolescent, he will hate 
himself. Acting out behavior, self destructive behavior are very strong 
liklihoods." 
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OPINION. 
It is my opinion if lat the probability of ^mo-ionai l«mage taking place 
which would result from removing Michael from the Carter home, far 
outweighs the potential conflict as to Michael not having a clear identity 
of himself as an Indian, and yet, also knowing that he is not Caucasian. It 
is my belief that the probability of emotional damage is at a very high level 
of certainty- -beyond a reasonable doubt. I will amplify this more in the 
Opinions and Recommendations Section, 
DATA AND REASONING: 
DAN LEWIS CAR; FER • 
358 East 100 North 
Spanish Fork, Utah, 84860 
Telephone: 798-9268 
Date of Birth: December 22, 1951 
Date of Interview: October 5, 1984 '• 
Dan Carter is a 32 year old, Caucasian male who is 5 feet, 8 inches in 
height, and weighs 175 pounds He has blonde hair and blue eyes. He 
presents himself in a very straight forward a nd direct, and yet, 
non-confrontive and non-abrasive manner, 
Dai i conies from a family that consists of his father, Earl carter, who is 
now 57 years of age, and is a plumber. With the exception of hypertension, 
Mr. Carter is said to be in good health. DanTs mother, Ann Carter, is 53 
years of age, and is in good health. Dan is the oldest child in the family. 
There was a older sister that died when Dan was six. Dan has a brother who 
is 30 years of age, and is married, and is in computer programming, and he 
and his wife are the parents of two children. Kathy is 26 years of age, 
married, and she her husband have two children, Christine is 22 years of 
age. Her husband is in computer programming at the Brigham Young 
University. They do not have any children. The two youngest children in the 
family are Matthew, 13 years of age, and Karen, 7 years of age, 
Dan said he had a very good relationship with his parents. There were many 
family projects. They had a cabin at Strawberry Reservoir, and spent much 
time in the outdoors, 
Dan graduated from, Provo High School .n I;J-'IL He thrn, went to Brigham 
Young University for a semester, and then, fille- a mission in Austria, for 
the then, two years period of time. He received an honorable release from 
his mission. He then, attended Brigham Young University for another 
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semester and one-half, and then, went to the Utah Technical College for 
two quarters so he could play baseball . Since that time, he has been 
working with his father and currently is a journeyman plumber. 
Dan married in 1975 to Pat Hawkins and they have had no biologic children 
from this marriage. Thus, Michael is the only child in the home. 
Dan said he and Pat have a good relationship with each other. They are 
active in the L.D.S. Church. Dan is in the elderTs quorum presidency. 
Neither of them use street drugs or alcohol, nor do they smoke. Dan said 
the only legal problems that he has had was when he was a youngster, he 
was picked up for setting off firecrackers and he has had a few traffic 
tickets as an adult. The couple are buying their home in Spanish Fork. 
Dan said he continues to enjoy the outdoors. He and Pat take Michael 
fishing a good deal, and as Michael gets a little older, he will go hunting 
with Dan. 
Dan indicated that he had no mental illnesses in his family. He said his 
mother, when she was Relief Society president, seemed to develop a anxiety 
reaction briefly and was hospitalized for this. There were no evidences of 
alcohol abuse in the immediate or extended family. 
Dan said he sleeps well at night. He is usually in bed by 10:30 at night. He 
is asleep within 10 minutes. He sleeps until the alarm goes off at 7:00 in 
the morning. He said he has a very good appetite. He said his moods are 
very stable. He seldom finds himself depressed, although, he is quite 
concerned about the possibility of losing Michael. 
The Carters have had Michael since the latter part of March in 1980. Dan 
told me how a friend of theirs had been contacted by Aunt Polly and this 
person referred Aunt Polly to them. They were asked if they would like to 
adopt Michael. They received Michael when he was about two years and ten 
months of age. Michael has lived with them continuously. Dan indicated that 
the biological mother, Cecelia Sanders, has never visited Michael. He said 
in one court hearing (there have been two prior hearings) the mother 
claimed that she was not allowed to visit him but he said this is not true. 
They have never prohibited the mother from visiting Michael. He told me 
that Michael lived primarily with the maternal grandmother, Bessie Begay, 
and this is what you told me. 
You indicated in your letter that there was considerable evidence that 
Grandmother Begay was alcoholic, and that the child was often left 
unattended. Further, you indicaated that the mother, Cecelia Dick Sanders, 
"had little or no interest in him during that period of time." 
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Dan Carter said that they have never had any problems with Michael, that 
he is average to above average in school; he reads well, and he is good in 
arithmetic. He said Michael enjoys the church activities (with the exception 
that he fidgets in sacrament meeting) and he has a number of friends who 
play with him. Dan said he has never been teased because he is an Indian. 
Dan told me that, at one point, Cecelia told Judge Sam that Michael's 
biologic father was Anglo but in court, said the father was Indian. He also 
told me that after one of the court hearings, that the mother is reported to 
have said that she would prefer that Michael stay with the Carters. 
Dan told me that both the kindegarten teacher and the first grade teacher 
noticed that Michael became withdrawn and had a worried look when he 
knew that the court hearings were coming up. At the time of the second 
court hearing, Dan told me that Michael had nightmares and indicated that 
in his dreams, people and monkeys were coming to take him away. 
Apparently, Michael was examined in your office by Dr. Roll. The report 
indicates it was on January 14, 1983 but according to Dan and Pat, it was 
on December 10, 1983. Dan indicated that Dr. Robert Crist saw Michael on 
December 8, 1983, and advised the Carters not to tell Michael about these 
court hearings. Finally, Dan indicated to me that he grew up with a Navajo 
Indian, Ralph Wilson. Apparently, Ralph was in Dan's neighborhood from the 
time he was in the fifth grade until he was in his last year of high school. 
On the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, Dan obtained a vocabulary I.Q. of 
114, an abstraction I.Q. of 140, with a fullscale I.Q. of 126. Dan's lowered 
(though above average) vocabulary score is the result of Dan!s not reading 
very much when he was in school. It is obvious, though, that Dan is a very 
bright person, and now, he is trying to build his vocabulary. On the Bipolar 
Psychological Inventory, Dan, like so many parents that are involved in 
custody disputes, had a high score on the Lie scale. The other scores were 
all in the normal range. He scored as being a very open individual, one who 
was very optimistic, with good self-esteem, self-sufficiency, achieved 
oriented, gregarious, as a person who enjoyed family harmony, as a person 
who was socially conforming, with a good deal of self-control, and kindness, 
and emphathy. On the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, again, there was an 
effort made by Dan to put himself in as good of a light as possible, and all 
the scores were in the normal range. Once again, he showed himself to be a 
very gregarious and social individual. 
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PATRICIA HAWKINS CARTER: 
856 East 100 North 
Spanish Fork, Utah, 84660 
Telephone: 798-9268 
Date of Birth: September 24, 1953 
Date of Interview: October 5, 1984 
Patricia Carter, who prefers to be called Pat, is a 31 year old, Caucasian 
female, who stands five feet, one and one-half inches in height, and weighs 
175 pounds. She has blonde hair and hazel eyes. Pat comes from a family 
that consists of her father who is 58 or 59 years of age, and who runs a 
fast food restaurant. She said her father is in good health. Her mother, 
Helen Hawkins, is one or two years younger than Mr. Hawkins and is also in 
good health. The oldest child of this family is Kathy. She is 36 years of 
age. She is married and is the mother of three children. Her husband 
teaches at a University in California. Pam is next. She is 34 years of age. 
She is married and her husband works at the Utah State Prison. This couple 
have five children. Next is Ryan. He is 33 years of age. He and his wife 
have four children. He works at a convenience gas station and store. 
Finally, Pat is the youngest child in the family. She described herself as 
being a tomboy while she was growing up. She said she and Ryanwere very 
good friends. She said that in school, she did well on those things she was 
interested in, but frequently, she was not interested in school. She said she 
graduated from Provo High School in 1971, and then, went to the Technical 
College where she did well. She continued there for one term. She started 
dating Dan in 1975. They became engaged in June of 1975 and they were 
married September 23, 1975. 
Pat has had a number of female problems. She had a tubal pregnancy, and 
because of this, she only has a small piece of ovary left. She has never 
been able to get pregnant. The couple tried to investigate invitro 
fertilization but this has not been successful. Pat described herself as being 
in good health. She said there were no mental illnesses in her immediate or 
extended family. She said there was no alcohol or street drug abuse in her 
family, and she described hers and Danfs activity in church. She indicated 
that she thought she and Dan had a very good marriage. She said Dan had a 
temper. She said she sleeps very well at night. She goes to sleep 
immediately, and she has a good appetite. She said, like her husband, her 
moods seldom fluctuate. 
She told me they received Michael on March 23, 1980 and she said when he 
came to them, he did not speak english. He almost immediately became 
adjusted well in the family. She said initially, he knew how to beg moeny 
from people who came to her parents restaurant, and he also tried to 
erotically, kiss her and he would get erections when he did this. 
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Pat described Michaelfs mother, Cecelia, as being a very nice person. She 
said Cecelia has said many times that she wants Michael to be happy. She 
also described MichaelTs worries and nightmares at the times of the first 
and second court hearing and told me many of the same things that her 
husband, Dan, told me. She said she is worried as to what would happen if 
Michael were to go back to the reservation, that the biological mother is 
not active in church and Cecelia!s current husband, "hates Mormons." She 
also told me that, at one point, Cecelia said that Michael's father was 
Anglo but "is now saying Michael's father is a fullblooded Navajo. 
She told me Michael is large for his age; that he enjoys physical contact 
with people, and she described how well the children both at school and in 
church have accepted him. She described him as being "tougher than other 
kids." 
On the Bipolar Psychological Inventory, Pat scored high on the Lie scale. 
(Once again, this is not at all unusual for people in custody disputes to 
have a high score on this.) She showed herself to be a very dependent 
individual, as an individual who did not have a high degree of motivation, 
and as an individual who, when she was a child, felt that there was a fair 
amount of family discord. In contrast, she scored as having a good deal of 
psychic comfort, as being optimistic, as being socially conforming, and 
showing good self-control* On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory, she also tried to put herself in a good light, and all other scores 
were in the normal range. On the Shipley Institute of Living Scale,' she 
received a vocabulary I.Q. of 120, an abstraction LQ. of 120, and a 
fullscale LQ. of 120. 
MICHAEL CHAD CARTER: 
Date of Birth: May 14, 1977 
Date of Interview: October 5, 1984 
Michael Chad Carter is seven years and five months of age. When I saw 
him, he was in the 92nd percentile in weight, and the 87th percentile in 
height. Michael has dark brown hair, and brown eyes. He quickly adjusted 
himself to the interview and was outgoing and friendly. He told me of the 
friends he had, and told me how much he liked school, and how much he 
liked church. He said he has a bedroom of his own and that he and his 
father (Mr. Carter) played catch with football and baseball. They go fishing 
a lot and Michael said he was very happy with his parents. Michael told me 
that he had no memories of having lived with anybody else but the Carters, 
and he made it very clear to me that he wanted to stay with them. He told 
me about a cat that he had, a cat that his parents gave him. He talked 
about going to movies with his parents, and he talked about having five 
grandparents. These refer to the four anglo grandparents (Mr. and Mrs. 
Hawkins and Mr. and Mrs. Carter, and then, the father of Mr. Carter). 
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Michael indicated that when he grows up, he would probably marry a white 
girl and he said he wanted to do things like his dad (Mr. Carter) did. 
As I indicated, Emily Fallis, one of my doctoral students, gave Michael the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for children, Revised Edition. On this, he 
obtained a verbal I.Q. of 107, an non-verbal or performance I.Q. of 100, and 
a fullscale I.Q. of 103. Ms. Fallis indicated that Michael was a very open 
and personable child. She indicated that he was quick to admit when he 
didnTt know an answer, and would sometimes ask her for the correct 
answer. She described him as having a mature and flexible manner as 
opposed to a dependent manner, and said that he was talkative but was 
attentive to the tasks at hand. It is interesting to note that on the subtests 
that Michael's general fund of information was above average, as was his 
ability to abstract, as was his vocabulary. It was also noted that his writing 
and arithmetic ability were at the average to above average range. As I 
indicated, I gave Michael the ChildrenTs Apperception Test. On this test, he 
showed the usual boy (masculine) type of stories. The Rorschach indicated a 
very good reality testing on Michael's part. His identity formation has 
formed quicker than children his age and there is no evidence of any 
emotional or psychological disturbance. The computer printout indicates the 
following: 
1. The personality style is well entrenched and stable currently 
due to the presence of a preponderance of organized 
psychological activity over more disruptive and irritating 
activity. 
2. Mature and organized controls are adequate to the 
controlled expression of these needs. 
3. Emotional discharges will not be well modulated. (However) 
sufficient controls exist that the client may be seen simply as 
very colorful or creative. 
4. There is a clear potential for impulsivity, inappropriate 
behavior, and or affective excesses. 
5. There is an average degree of perceptual accuracy or reality 
testing, both at times when emotions and thoughts are allowed 
free expression and when these activties are kept under 
stricter control. 
6. The client's aspirations appear comensurate with his or her 
abilities. 
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7. The client is quite aware of other people and may even be 
overly concerned about them." 
LINDA CORAY: 
Interview: October 6, 1984 
Telephone: 798-2463 
Linda Coray, Michael's kindegarten teacher, said that Michael was very 
quiet when he first came to school, but in late October and November, they 
had a unit on Indians at Thanksgiving, and he was the Indian in the 
program,"and he blossomed from that experience." She said he did very well 
in school. While he wasn't the fastest student, he was a very good student 
in school. She said she thought Mr. and Mrs. Carter may have had too high 
of expectations at first, but the parents kept in close contact with the 
school, and they quickly adjusted their expectations in keeping with 
suggestions from Mrs. Coray. She said Michael frequently would bring things 
such as animal skins that Mr. Carter had tanned to school, and she 
commented that both parents came to every parent-teacher meeting that 
was held. She said it was uncommon for both parents of children in her 
class to always come to these meetings. She commented that Michael 
became more withdrawn when the (first) court hearing was imminent. She 
commented that he had never talked about things that happened when he 
was living with his "Indian parents" and when he was on the reservation. 
She said that he soon learned to speak as well as the other children. She 
said she lives in the neighborhood where the Carters live, and that Michael 
has fit in very well at church. She said he tries diligently to please other 
people and he is well accepted by other people. 
PAULA FARRER: 
Telephone: 377-1313 
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984 
Ms. Farrer was Michael's first grade teacher. She had Michael for six hours 
each day during the school year. She said he was never a behavior problem, 
that he was very talkative, and that he was a physical child. She said he 
excelled in reading and math. He was well accepted by the other children. 
She said he was upset during the court hearing and he seemed quite 
nervous. She said he told her once, "I'm going to see a man to see if I can 
stay at home with my Mom and Dad." She said she thought he had a very 
good relationship with both parents. She said the father (Mr. Carter) did 
many things with him in sports and outdoor activities. She said the mother 
would come to school as a mother's helper, and she could see that Michael 
and Pat got along well with each other. She said he scored well on the 
standardized achievement tests, especially, in reading comprehension and 
science. Finally, she said he was as well adjusted as any of the other 
children and that "he never mentioned anybody but the Carters as being 
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parents." 
VIRGINIA HANSEN: 
Telephone: 798-3421 
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984 
Ms. Hansen told me that Mike was doing very well in the second grade. He 
has a very good self concept. He has many friends. She said he did well in 
reading and math, that he was not a discipline problem. She described him 
as being a very happy child, and he was in the best reading group in her 
class. She said she was impressed with the Carters as parents because they 
kept up on his reading assignments, and that it was obvious that they are 
helping him with his schoolwork. She said Mike has talked about the family 
vacations and doing things both with his parents and with his grandparents 
and his cousins. 
ANN CARTER: 
280 West 1730 North 
Provo, Utah, 84604 
Telephone: 373-3197 
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984 
Mrs. Carter is Danfs mother. She described Dan as being a very good 
person, both as a child and as a father and husband. She said Dan had 
worked with his father for many years and enjoyed working with his father. 
She said she thought that Pat and Dan got along with each other very well 
and that they were surprisingly compatible, especially, considering the fact 
that Pat had never been involved in sports and outdoors. "Now, she does 
everything with Dan." She said Dan, Pat, and Michael are alwyays doing 
things as a family. She said they do so much as a family that they seldom 
ask her to babysit Michael. She told me about when Dan was growing up 
that the neighbors had Indian children. She specifically mentioned Ralph 
Wilson and the fact that Dan associated with Ralph as one of his best 
friends. She told me that Dan was broken hearted when the social worker 
said they were going to take Mike back to the reservation. She is happy 
that Dan and Pat are fighting "to keep Mike with them." 
She described Mike as being surprisingly alert and inquisitive, and said that 
he asked many questions. 
ALBERT HAWKINS: 
Telephone: 377-2495 
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984 
Mr. Hawkins is Pat!s father. He described Pat and Dan as being very 
devoted to Mike. He said that Pat and Dan had an excellent relationship 
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with each other and that Mike is much better behaved and minds better 
than some of their other grandchildren. He said he thinks the best interests 
of Mike would be met by Mike continuuing to live with Pat and Dan. He 
concluded by saying that Michael gets along very well with his cousins 
"especially, the boys his size." 
MRS. MARIAN SEAMONS: 
Telephone: 225-1916 
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984 
Mrs. Seamons and her husband have had number of Indian children live with 
them during the schoolyear. Especially, a Ralph Wilson, who was with them 
from the time when he was in the fifth grade to the time he was in his last 
year of high school. She said that Ralph and Dan were very good friends 
and she thought that they got along well with each other and that Dan was 
appreciative and accepting of Ralph. She said she had seen Dan and Pat and 
Michael together. She described xMichael as being well adjusted and happy 
and said Michael is very well cared for. She said if she had a child that 
needed to have parents, she would choose Pat and Dan as the parents for 
the child. 
MR. AND MRS. MELVIN CARTER: 
Telephone: 798-6296 
Date of Interview: October 8, 1984 
Mr. and Mrs. Carter have also had a number of Indian children in their 
home. They currently have a Navajo girl. They know the Carters quite well. 
She said Pat and Dan are good parents to Mike. They allow him freedom to 
have friends and yet, they have expectations for him and they are good 
disciplinarians for him. 
MATERIAL FROM DR. ROLLTS REPORT: 
It is interesting to read Dr. RolTs report on Michael. He describes Michael 
as having a well developed capacity to relate to other people and he 
indicated: 
Jeremiah is very closely and warmly bonded and attached to 
the Carters. It is clear that he sees them as faithful and 
powerful sources of stimulation, confidence, and security. He 
also looks to them for positive, productive discipline. His love 
and bonding to them very strongly speaks to the value that the 
relationship with Carters has for him. It is very difficult for 
Jeremiah to make a break with the Carters and will cause 
considerable pain and period of painful mourning. It is clear 
that Jeremiah will not be able to go through this period 
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successfully without close supervision and professional help. 
On the other side, Dr. Roll indicates that Jeremiah is suffering from a mild 
to moderate depression. (I did not see this when I examined him.) He 
indicated that: 
He sees Indians as bad, ugly, and frightened. He sees his Indian 
mother, particular, as bad, ugly, and weak, dumb, and dishonest. 
He sometimes refers to characters in his fantasies as ugly, 
brown Indians and generally, represents Indians as being 
destructive or damaged. (Further, he indicates that Jeremiah) 
reports he is an Indian now but when he grows up, he will be a 
white man, which he explains is better because they are 
stronger. All Indians are weak, canTt chop wood and white men 
can. He also said his baby will be white. Further, he explains 
the Indian part of him will come out in the baby by the baby 
playing with Indians. This extreme confusion about his own 
racial identity, a very serious and negative view of Indians, and 
about his own specific origins are striking and pathological." 
(Dr. Roll concludes), it will be safer in the long run if after a 
period of visitation and preparation, Jeremiah be returned to 
the Navajo family. The period of preparation will take, at least, 
a year and will require supervised visitation of increasing 
lengths and frequency. During this time, the families involved 
and Jeremiah are going to need professional assistance in the 
form of supportive social work and family therapy. In sum, 
there is no way to avoid hurting Jeremiah. My recommendation 
that in the long run, the least pain to Jeremiah will result by 
returning him to his Navajo family. Whether this is done or not, 
he and those caring for him are going to have to take extensive 
steps in order to keep an evitably painful process from 
becoming even more painful." 
LIBRARY SEARCH BY LURA TIBBITTS-KLEBER: 
As indicated, I have attached a library search to this report and will not 
repeat the contents of this in this report. I will only note that the 
literature as known by Mrs. Tibbitts—Kleber, who is doing her doctoral 
research on parental and child attachment disorders clearly points to family 
and parental disruption as being much more serious than racial confusion. 
REPORT FROM PAUL BUCKINGHAM: 
As I indicated, I asked Mr. Paul Buckingham to examine the Carters and 
Michael. Mr. Buckingham has worked for a number of years in placing 
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Indian children and adolescents in foster homes. Mr. BuckinghamTs report, 
based on his first visit (and one or two more visits have been scheduled) is 
attached and indicates that Michael and Mr. and Mrs. Carter are firmly 
bonded to each other. To separate this bonding is precarious at best. Mr. 
Buckingham is of the opinion that should Michael be allowed to stay with 
the Carters, he will undoubtedly become a bicultural person. Mr. 
Buckingham does not see this as detrimental to Michaelfs well being 
OPINIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. Michael is a bright youngster who has no memory of his life for, two 
years and ten months on the reservation. 
2. Michael is well adjusted in the home that he is now in and sees Mr. and 
Mrs. Carter as his parents. In my opinion, the Carters are his psychological 
parents. 
3. It is my opinion that Michael will be emotionally damaged by taking him 
out of the home. The nearly five years that he has spent with the Carters, 
especially, when considering the early age that he came with them, clearly 
speaks to the importance of his continuuing to live with them. 
4. I agree with Dr. Roll that effort should be made to inculcate in Michael 
an appreciation for his heritage, and I see no reason why contact could not 
be effected between Cecelia Sanders and Michael. 
5. I could not find any evidence that Michael was depressed. If he was 
depressed when Dr. Roll saw him, it is likely that this was a reaction to his 
fears that he would be taken away from the Carters. He told his school 
teacher Paula Farrer that he was going to see a man to determine if he 
could keep living with the Carters. 
If I may be of any futher help in this matter, please feel free to contact 
me. 
Sincerely yours 
^ ^ . J i ^ ^ -
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D. 
1190 North Ninth East #285 
Provo, Utah 84604 
RJH:mr 
Attachments 
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Tnf*rv-jPW with Michael Chad Clark. 
JL • * Clark, and Patricia Clark 
• October 10, 1984 
On October 10, 1984, I had the opportunity to observe and interview .Mike 
Carter in the presence of his parents, Dan and Pat The interview lasted 
approximately forty-five minutes. I observed Mike to be relaxed and open in 
his conversation and answers. During the interview, he stood for a litle while 
but mostly leaned, layed and sat on his father's lap. His overall demeanor was 
relaxed and comfortable with the setting, and throughout the interview he 
maintained a physical attachment with his father. His answers were assured 
and discriptive. His communication, both verbal and nonverbal, demonstrated a 
close bond between himself and his parents. We discussed the expression of 
emotion, both positive and negative., (i.e., he is affectionate and says he loves 
his parents almost daily, he glares and at times -yells when he is very unhappy,, 
angry, or very disappointed). It is evident that Mike is bonded to the Carters. 
We discussed what is planned as far as the maintainance of heritage and 
Navajo culture in Mike's life. The parents plan to utilize relatives and the 
resources at RYU to instill pride in his ethnicity and recover traditions of his 
people. Trips to the reservation, the parents having more intense study of the 
Navajo culture, and the re-learning of the language, are all future goals of the 
parents to have their son maintain his heritage while learning to function well 
in the dominant white man's society. 
It would appear that the intent of the paresis
 r :osui"^ :.> .. v &ujut the child 
to bi-culturality rather than to make him white or assimilated into a 
traditional Wasatch white mormon youth. Presently his relationship with his 
parents appears to be excellent and very close. Disruption of this bond in the 
name of ethnic heritage would probably cause retardation of self-worth, 
identity,, and ability to cope and problem solve in the future 
Respectfully, 
"" <&*< > A crT^^^T ; 
• uckiiigr.dm Mr;*> -IV 
license £ 732 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT C^\\-, ' •' £/* 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
$0/ 
*» 
NAVAJO NATION; NAVAJO NATION, as 
parens patriae for JEREMIAH 
HALLOWAY, CECELIA SAUNDERS, 
BESSIE BEGAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY, 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE 
OF UTAH; HONORABLE DAVID SAM; 
DAN and PATRICIA CARTER, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
IN FURTHERANCE OF 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C35-317G 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on August 29, 
1985, on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of defendants District Court for Utah County, 
Fourth Judicial District, State of Utah, and Honorable David Sam; 
and the Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, for Summary 
Judgment of defendants Dan and Patricia Carter. Craig J. Dorsay 
of the Navajo Nation Department of Justice appeared on behalf of 
the plaintiffs, Stephen J. Sorenson of the Utah Attorney 
General's office appeared on behalf of defendants District Court 
for Utah County, Fourth Judicial District, State of Utah and 
Honorable David Sam, and Richard B. Johnson of Howard, Lev/is & 
Sorenson appeared on behalf of defendants Dan and Patricia 
Carter. Having reviewed extensive memoranda of law and exhibits 
which were filed with the Court, and having heard extensive oral Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
arguments of all counsel, the Court granted the defendants1 
Motions for Summary Judgment and denied the plaintiffs1 Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Having further reviewed all matters and 
being fully advised, the Court now sets forth its Memorandum 
Decision as was contemplated at the time the oral orders were 
rendered. This Memorandum Decision is incorporated into the 
orders made on August 29, 1985. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This action arose out of an adoption proceeding in the 
District Court for Utah County, Fourth Judicial District, State 
of Utah. Jeremiah Halloway, the subject of the proceeding, was 
born on May 14, 1977, to plaintiff, Cecilia Saunders, a full-
blooded Navajo, a member of the Navajo Tribe and a domiciliary of 
the Navajo Reservation. Jeremiah lived the first six months of 
his life with his mother, after which he was under the care of 
his maternal grandmother, Bessie Begay. In March of 1930, a 
maternal aunt removed Jeremiah from the reservation with the oral 
consent of the mother and took him to Utah for adoptive placement 
with defendants Dan and Patricia Carter. In May of 1980, the 
natural mother appeared in the District Court for Utah County and 
executed a Consent to Adoption after which defendants Dan and 
Patricia Carter then filed a petition for adoption. Defendant 
Judge David Sam ordered counsel for defendants Dan and Patricia 
Carter to give notice seeking the consent of the Navajo Tribe 
before proceeding with the adoption, and notification was given 
approximately five months later to plaintiff Navajo Nation. Some 
two years after the petition for adoption was filed, in May of Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1982, the Navajo Nation appeared in the lav/suit as intervenor and 
filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding and transfer 
jurisdiction to the tribe on the basis of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act of 1973 (ICWA), Pub. L. No. 95-608 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). After a hearing on the matter, on July 
14, 1982, defendant Judge David Sam awarded temporary custody to 
Dan and Patricia Carter, and ruled that the domicile of the child 
was that of the adoptive parents, that good cause existed for the 
State Court to retain jurisdiction, and that the requirements of 
the ICWA had been satisfied. The State Court gave the parties 
additional opportunity to present further evidence on the 
domicile issue, and after receiving that evidence, entered an 
order dated October 6, 1983, reaffirming its finding that the 
child's domicile was that of the adoptive parents and that good 
cause existed under the ICWA for the State Court to retain 
jurisdiction. The Court also ruled that there had been an 
abandonment of the child. 
On October 12, 1984, the District Court of the Navajo 
Nation for Window Rock found that, pursuant to Navajo common law 
and statute, the domicile of Jeremiah had at all times remained 
within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation and that the 
Navajo Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction under tribal statutes, 
common law and the ICWA to determine the custody of Jeremiah 
Halloway. Just prior to the date set for trial termination of 
the parental rights, the Navajo Nation filed a Motion for Full 
Faith and Credit and to Dismiss in the state court proceedings, 
based upon the ruling of the Navajo District Court that it had 
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exclusive jurisdiction over the adoption proceedings and that the 
Fourth District Court was without jurisdiction. At the beginning 
of the trial on October 22, 1984, the State Court denied the 
motion as untimely, and went ahead with the trial on the 
termination of parental rights. On January 28, 1985, defendant 
Judge David Sam entered his decision, finding: 
(1) That the evidence (including expert 
testimony) established beyond a reasonable 
doubt that to return Jeremiah to his Indian 
custodians would result in serious emotional 
or physical damage to him; 
(2) That active efforts have been undertaken 
to attempt the rehabilitation of the Indian 
family and have failed; and 
(3) That the biological mother knowingly and 
voluntarily abandoned the child as defined in 
Utah Code Annotated 78-3a-48(1). 
The State Court therefore granted the petition for adoption, and 
on February 28, 1985, the Navajo Nation filed a Notice of Appeal 
of Judge David Sam's decision to the Utah Supreme Court. That 
appeal presently is pending and being pursued by all parties. On 
March 15, 1985, plaintiffs filed the instant action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah. 
The action before this Court contains fifteen separate 
claims for relief based on alleged violation by the defendants of 
the ICWA and the United States Constitution. Six claims seek 
recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of civil 
rights; eight claims seek declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 
2201, alleging that the exercise of state jurisdiction was void; 
and one pendent claim alleges that the placement of Jeremiah with 
the adoptive parents violated the Interstate Compact on Placement 
-4-
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of Children, Utah Code Ann. § 55-8b-1, et seq. The plaintiffs 
also seek monetary relief against all defendants for violation of 
civil rights, and declaration of their rights under the ICWA, the 
United States Constitution and state lav/. 
INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT 
The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted in 1978 to 
remedy perceived inequities in adoption standards for Indian 
children. The Act represents congressional recognition of the 
interest of Indian Tribes in the preservation of their valuable 
heritage. Background and cultural differences between society 
generally and the Indian nations had greatly influenced social 
and adoptive agencies to increase the numbers of Indian children 
being placed in foster and adoptive homes. A general 
misunderstanding of Indian culture compounded the numbers of 
Indian children being separated from their families. In 1978, 
after recognizing that greater than one-fourth of all Indian 
children were separated from their families and placed in foster 
homes, adoptive homes or institutions, Congress declared that 
"[t]he wholesale separation of Indian children from their 
families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of 
American Indian life today." K. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess., 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7530, 
7531. Therefore, in 1978, Congress enacted ICWA, the purpose of 
which was 
to protect the best interest of Indian 
children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families by 
establishing minimum Federal standards for the 
removal of Indian children from their families 
and the placement of such children in foster 
-5-
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or adoptive homes or institutions which will 
reflect the unique values of Indian culture 
and by providing for assistance to Indian 
tribes and organizations in the operation of 
child and family service programs. 
Id. at 1. This Court is aware of and shares that concern. As 
one court stated: 
Each individual is an amalgam of the 
predominant religious, linguistic, ancestral 
and educational influences existent in his or 
her surroundings. Indian people, whether 
residing on a reservation or not, are immersed 
in an environment which is in most respects 
antithetical to their traditions. 
Furthermore, the cultural diversity among 
Indian tribes is unquestionably profound yet 
often not fully appreciated in our society 
• . . • 
Preservation of Indian culture is undoubtedly 
threatened and thereby thwarted as the size of 
any tribal community dwindles. In addition to 
its artifacts, language and history, the 
members of a tribe are its culture. Absent 
the next generation, any culture is lost and 
necessarily relegated, at best, to 
anthropological examination and 
categorization. 
Matter of M.E.M., 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Mont. 1981). This Court 
is cognizant of the responsibility to promote and protect the 
unique Indian cultures of this and other states. This Court als 
is aware, however, that the ICWA and principles of equity requir 
that the interests of the individual also must be protected, not 
in derogation of the Act but in compliance with its specific 
provisions. 
In order to further Congress1 desire to promote the 
welfare of Indian children, families and culture, the ICWA lays 
jurisdiction over Indian child adoption proceedings in the tribe 
or the state respectively, depending on the domicile of the 
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child. The Indian tribe has exclusive jurisdiction over any 
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or 
is domiciled within the reservation. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1982). 
A state court has jurisdiction over foster care placement or 
termination of parental rights of Indian children not domiciled 
or residing within the reservation, but the Act requires the 
state court to transfer the proceeding to the tribe upon petition 
of either parent, the custodian or the child's tribe, absent good 
cause to the contrary or objection of either parent. Ld. § 
1911(b). The Act also requires that the United States, every 
state and territory and every Indian tribe f,give full faith and 
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
Indian tribes applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to 
the same extent that such entities give full faith and credit to 
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any other 
entity." Id. § 1911(d). 
The Act necessarily contemplates the state court's 
involvement in Indian child adoption proceedings. Indeed, the 
ICWA grants concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts 
over adoption proceedings brought under its provisions. 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1921 (1982); 28 U.S.C. 1360(a) (1982). "Where 
the Act applies, the state court has a duty to exercise its 
jurisdiction over actions brought thereunder, since to decline 
jurisdiction in such a case would violate the supremacy clause of 
the federal [Constitution." E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210, 1215 
n.13 (Alaska 1981) [citing Testa v. Katz, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); 
Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co,, 223 U.S. 1 
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(1911)]. A state court therefore has a right and a need to 
determine its own jurisdiction in Indian child adoption cases 
brought before it, and a judge making such a determination 
clearly would be acting within the scope of his judicial 
capacity, regardless of the propriety of his ruling on the 
jurisdictional question. 
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN CHILD ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction in such proceedings is based upon a 
determination of the domicile of the child. That question was 
squarely before the state District Court, which took cognizance 
of the issue and made its determination after fully hearing 
evidence and arguments of the parties. That Court found that the 
childfs domicile was in Utah with the adoptive parents, and that 
transfer of the proceedings to the tribal court would not be in 
the best interests of the child. Those findings are currently on 
appeal before the Utah Supreme Court. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to render a declaration of 
their rights under the ICWA and the United States Constitution, 
contending that these are additional issues not raised in the 
state court proceedings. But those claims presented here as 
alleged constitutional and statutory infringements will live or 
die on a determination of the issue of domicile, an issue that 
was fully presented and litigated in the state proceeding which 
is now pending before the Utah Supreme Court. Reversal on the 
domicile issue in state court basically would give the plaintiffs 
the declaratory relief they seek in this Court. On the other 
hand, affirmance would open the avenue of redress before the 
- A -
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Supreme Court of the United States on the constitutional issues. 
It would be premature and inappropriate for this Court to enter 
rulings of any kind in the present posture of this litigation. 
CLAIMS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF 
Because the issue of domicile was fully litigated in 
the state court proceeding, and now the question of the propriety 
of the State Court's application of law and determination of 
domicile is pending before the state's highest court, this Court 
exercised its discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act by 
dismissing plaintiffs1 claim for declaratory relief. It is 
appropriate for federal courts to deny a declaratory judgment 
under 28 U.S.C., Section 2201 where the issues raised are likely 
to be fully adjudicated in an action pending in state court at 
the time the declaratory judgment action is filed in federal 
court. Moore's Federal Practice 51 0.220, at 2387-88 (1985) 
[citing Miller v. Miller, .423 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1970).] The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized and upheld exercise of 
discretion by district courts in such circumstances, ruling that 
a district court is under no compulsion to exercise jurisdiction, 
and recognizing that: 
The decision in such circumstances is 
largely committed to the discretion of the 
District Court. . ; . (and) . . . that such 
deference may be equally appropriate even when 
matters of substantive federal law are 
involved in the case. (Footnote omitted.) 
Will, U.S. District Judge v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 
655 (1978) cited in Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 
F.2d 1116, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 1979). See also, State Farm Mut. 
-9-
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Auto Ins, Co, v, Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1971), 
and Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona/ 103 S. Ct. 
3201 (1983), wherein the Court affirmed district court orders 
granting motions to dismiss federal actions seeking adjudication 
of water rights, where concurrent state court actions had 
previously been initiated. The issue of domicile and whether 
it was appropriate for the state court to assume jurisdiction 
over the adoption proceedings in this case is precisely the 
question presented before the Utah Supreme Court. This Court 
does not sit as an appellate court for state decisions, and 
declaratory judgment should not be used to re-examine what has 
been adjudicated in another forum. 1A J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. 
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 51 0.220, at 2388 n.7 (1985). 
See American Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. United Founders Life Ins. 
Co., 515 F. Supp. 800, (W.D. Okl. 1980), and cases cited therein. 
All parties had full and complete opportunity to be 
heard in the state court proceedings. It would not be in the 
interests of judicial economy, federal-state comity or the 
avoidance of piecemeal and duplicative litigation for this Court 
to act upon plaintiffs1 claims for declaratory relief or the 
Section 1983 claims. 
SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
The United States Supreme Court has held that rules of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to Section 
1983 actions, where a final judgment on the merits of an action 
has been rendered in state court and the same issues that were or 
-10-
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could have been raised in that action are later sought to be 
raised in a federal action. Allen v, McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 
(1980). The Court stated in the Allen case: 
The federal courts have traditionally adhered 
to the related doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel. Under res judicata, a 
final judgment on the merits of an action 
precludes the parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have 
been raised in that action. . . . Under 
collateral estoppel, once a court has decided 
an issue of fact or law necessary to its 
judgment, that decision may preclude 
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a 
different cause of action involving a party to 
the first case. . . . As this Court and other 
courts have often recognized, res judicata and 
collateral estoppel relieve parties of the 
cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, 
conserve judicial resources and, by preventing 
inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on 
adjudication. 
Id. at 94 (citations omitted). 
To allow relitigation of the question of the child's 
domicile, and ultimately the appropriateness of the state court's 
taking jurisdiction of the case for purposes of the Section 1983 
claims now asserted, would be to deny the state court system the 
full faith and credit to which it is entitled, and would violate 
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In the 
recent case of Migra v. Warren City School District Board of 
Education, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984), the Supreme Court stated: 
It is now settled that a federal court must 
give to a state-court judgment the same 
preclusive effect as would be given that 
judgment under the law of the state in which 
the judgment was rendered. 
-11-
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Id, at 61. Utah follows the general principles of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel as discussed above. See Penrod v. Nu 
Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983); Bernard v. 
Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981). This Court finds that the 
basis for the plaintiffs1 claims for violation of civil rights 
under Section 1983 was fully litigated on the merits in the state 
proceeding and this Court is bound by the State Court's decision. 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: DECISION OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE NAVAJO NATION 
As observed above, the decision of the District Court 
of Utah is entitled to full faith and credit. But plaintiffs ask 
this Court to find that the decision of the District Court of the 
Navajo Nation for Window Rock that the Navajo Tribe had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding and that Jeremiah was 
domiciled on the reservation was entitled to full faith and 
credit by the State District Court. The determination by the 
District Court of the Navajo Nation was made some four and one-
half years after the Consent of Adoption was given by the child's 
mother in open court in the District Court of Utah, and after 
extensive evidence was presented on the domicile issue following 
a substantial period of total inaction and inattention to the 
matter by the plaintiff Navajo Nation. 
There is no question that the ICWA requires universal 
recognition of the acts, records and judicial proceedings of any 
Indian Tribe. The Act states: 
The United States, every State, every 
territory or possession of the United States, 
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith 
and credit to the public acts, records, and 
-12-
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judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe 
applicable to Indian child custody proceedings 
to the same extent that such entities give 
full faith and credit to the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of any other 
entity. 
25 U.S.C. § 1911(d). This statute does not require, however, 
that the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any 
Indian tribe be accorded greater weight than the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of a state. Indeed, an Indian 
tribe is bound to give full faith and credit to the public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings of a state. Where the state 
court acts within the scope of its judicial capacity to determine 
personal jurisdiction and that issue is fully litigated, the 
State court clearly would not be required to relinquish 
jurisdiction based upon the court order of a sister state over a 
year later. The same is true of the subsequent Tribal Court 
Order. 
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY 
Although we need not reach the question of judicial 
immunity, this Court finds it appropriate to address this point 
as an additional basis for dismissal of the claims against 
defendant Judge David Sam. This Court holds that Judge Sam is 
absolutely immune from any claim for damages, and that injunctive 
and declaratory relief against him would serve no purpose. 
A. Claims for Monetary Relief 
It is a firmly established principle in our 
judicial system that judges are immune from liability for acts 
committed within their judicial capacity. The reason for this 
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judicial immunity, as outlined in Bradley v. Fisher, is that 
judges must be free to act upon their own convictions, without 
concern of personal consequences to themselves. 13 Wall. 335 
(1871). Although judicial immunity is not without limitations, 
"a judge is entitled to judicial immunity if he has not acted in 
clear absence of all jurisdiction and if the act was a judicial 
one. An act is judicial if it is a function normally performed 
by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial 
capacity . . . A judge is entitled to immunity even if he acted 
with partiality, maliciously, or corruptly." Martinez v. Winner, 
No. 82-2110, slip op. at 8 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1935) [citing 
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, 
13 Wall. 335, 348 (1871)]. Although there is danger that some 
wrongs may go unredressed as a result of the application of 
judicial immunity, our system of justice has found it more 
tolerable for a few wrongs to go unredressed than for the courts 
to be constantly harassed by suits brought by disappointed 
litigants. Id. slip op. at 12. The questions presented before 
this Court are whether the alleged wrongful conduct of Judge 
David Sam occurred outside of Judge Sam's judicial capacity or 
function and whether Judge Sam acted in clear absence of all 
jurisdiction. It is clear from the facts that at all times for 
which wrongful conduct is alleged Judge Sam was acting in his 
judicial capacity and that all his acts were judicial ones. 
Additionally, as has been thoroughly discussed, the ICWA 
contemplates state courts making determinations of personal 
jurisdiction in Indian child adoption proceedings and taking 
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jurisdiction in appropriate cases. The state court's 
jurisdiction under the Act to determine its own jurisdiction 
constituted judicial action on the part of Judge Sam. 
Determination of the issues as to domicile and personal 
jurisdiction certainly was not in clear absence of all 
jurisdiction, and at the very least constituted a colorable claim 
of jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court rules that as to the 
claims for monetary relief, defendant Judge Sam is absolutely 
immune. 
b. Claims for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
Although the United States Supreme Court recently 
found that judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective 
injunctive relief against a judicial officer, nor to the award of 
attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in cases where prospective 
injunctive relief is granted, Pulliam v. Allen*, 104 S. Ct. 1970 
(1984), the question presented here is whether this case is 
appropriate for collateral prospective relief. Unlike the 
respondents in Pulliam, who sought to enjoin a state Magistrate 
from requiring bond for a nonincarcerable offense, the plaintiffs 
in his case do not seek the prospective enjoining of an ongoing 
unconstitutional practice, but rather seek to reverse a final 
judgment which resulted from evidentiary hearings in a specific 
case. The plaintiffs1 request is more in the nature of appellate 
review of the State Court decision. Therefore, this Court finds 
that the narrow exception to the doctrine of judicial immunity as 
1 C 
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articulated in the Pulliam decision does not apply to the facts 
of this case, and the claims for declaratory and injunctive 
relief against defendant David Sam are dismissed. 
One additional question that is implicit in the 
plaintiffs1 arguments is whether Section 1983 somehow overcomes 
the common law doctrine of judicial immunity. That point was 
thoroughly addressed in the recent case of Martinez v. Winner, 
548 F. Supp. 278 (D. Utah 1982), aff'd. No. 82.2110 (10th Cir. 
Aug. 22, 1984). That case involved alleged intentionally 
wrongful and conspiratorial violations of the Civil Rights Act by 
a judge. Martinez asked the Court to find an exception in such 
conduct to the common law doctrine of judicial immunity. Chief 
Judge Jenkins of the District Court for Utah in the initial 
decision in Martinez pointed out that in Pierson [v. Ray, 386 
U.S. 547 (1967], the United States Supreme Court held that the 
common-law doctrine of judicial immunity was not abridged by the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as codified in 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, and that "State judges are thus immune from suit 
under § 1983 for their 'judicial1 acts.11 548 F. Supp at 292. 
This Court finds no basis in law or in fact for 
plaintiffs1 claims against defendant David Sam for monetary or 
prospective injunctive relief. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendants1 Motions for 
Summary Judgment are granted, and plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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Ho-
DATED: September ^Q , 1985. 
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UNI/TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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